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Recent Developments In Equal Employment
Opportunity Litigation
Howard R. Besser*
HE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT1, enacted on July 2nd of that year,
represented an attempt by the federal government to deal with
unlawful discrimination in many fields of endeavor, including hous-
ing, employment, public accommodations and facilities, federally
assisted and federally funded programs, voting rights, etc. . Title VII
of that Act is specifically concerned with equal employment oppor-
tunity and creates the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
to carry out the functions of the law.
Most of the decisional law under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, has concerned issues that might be properly titled "pro-
cedural." William Brown, Chairman, of the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) pointed out that it was not surprising
in light of the relative youth of the agency that much of the litigation
in which EEOC participated during its first five years involved pro-
cedural aspects of the law.2 He further stated:
Between 1965 and 1970, most defendants in Title VII
suits have been willing to bear the expense of litigating pro-
cedural issues. These defendants have not been deterred,
even though the cases dragged on for years through appellate
courts and they bore the risk of paying plaintiff's attorn-
ney's fees.3
The federal government through the EEOC and the Justice
Department has ultimately prevailed in many, if not most of the
procedural issues that have been litigated. For example, in Bowe
v. Colgate-Palmolive Company,4 the court of appeals stated that the
court's remedial power under Title VII should be read quite broadly
and went on to indicate that the clear purpose of the Act was to
bring an end to the proscribed discriminatory practices and to make
whole in a pecuniary fashion those who have suffered because of
such practices. The Bowe court stated that to permit only injunctive
relief in the class action therein filed would have frustrated the im-
plementation of the strong congressional purposes expressed in the
Act and went on to hold that compensatory action was clearly called
*B.A., The Ohio State University; J. D., The Ohio State University College of Law; U.S.
District Counsel, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; Lecturer, The Cleveland
State University College of Law.
1 CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-e et seq. (1970).
2 Address by William Brown, Chiarman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
at Northwestern University Law School, Oct. 6, 1971.
3Id.
4416 F. 2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
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for, to those individuals who had suffered from prior discrimination
and that a class action could be maintained seeking monetary relief
for all of the members of a class, whether or not they had individually
filed complaints with the agency.5
The Application and Mis-application of the Doctrine of
Election of Remedies
The court in the Bowe case also indicated the right of the
charging party to pursue both contractual and statutory remedies
where statutory remedies provided by Title VII overlapped with those
provided by a collective bargaining agreement,6
In this regard, the question of "choice of remedies" or "election
of remedies" has often arisen under Title VII. in other words, the
question broadly stated is whether or not the invocation of a private
grievance procedure underneath a union collective bargaining agree-
ment would either be a bar to a further court action under Title VII
or would in some means estop someone from invoking a Title VII
action. In the Bowe decision, Circuit Judge Kerner indicated that:
The situation facing the Trial Court was one in which
there exists concurrent jurisdiction under the statutory
scheme and under the grievance and arbitration process for
the resolution of claims against an employer and a union.
The analogy to labor disputes involving concurrent juris-
diction of the N.L.R.B. and the arbitration process is not
merely compelling, we hold it conclusive. 7
Accordingly, Bowe held that it was error not to permit the
plaintiffs to utilize dual prosecution both in court and through arbi-
tration as long as the election of remedy was made after an adjudi-
cation so as to preclude duplicate relief which would result in either
unjust enrichment or a windfall to the plaintiffs.'
Bowe was quickly followed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decision in the case of Hutchings v. U.S. Industries, Inc.,' wherein
the court first determined that an individual employee's action in
federal court alleging racial discrimination in a denial of promotion
was not barred for failure to file a charge of discrimination with the
agency within the then-prescribed period of 90 days since the period
under the Act for a statute of limitations was tolled when the em-
t Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F. 2d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 1969).
61d. at 714.
71Id.
'Id. at 715. See also, Batiste v. Furnco Construction Co., 5 E. P. D. 8098, (N. D. 111., Dec.
30, 1972), which adopted the Bowe approach in denying the relief already secured via a
state agency and instead awarded only attorney fees which were not authorized by the
state law.
14 28 F. 2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970).
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ployee invoked his contractual grievance remedies in an effort to seek
private settlement of this complaint, citing an earlier Fifth Circuit
opinion in Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Company.10 The court went
on to hold that the unsuccessful resort to the grievance procedure
was not to be regarded as a bar to the institution of the Title VII
litigation.1 The court indicated that the determinations under a
contract grievance-arbitration process involved rights and remedies
very separate and distinct from those involved in judicial proceedings
under the statute and that any application of the doctrine of election
of remedies to suits brought under the Act must be limited to those
situations which would result in an unjust enrichment or a windfall.12
In reversing the district court determination that the plaintiff in
pursuing his contractual remedies to a final unfavorable determina-
tion under the contract was bound by that adverse determination in
the Title VII action, the court of appeals indicated that:
An arbitration award, whether adverse or favorable to
the employee, is not per se conclusive of the determination
of Title VII rights by the federal courts, nor is an inter-
mediate grievance determination deemed "settled" under the
bargaining contract to be given this effect.13
For these conclusions, the court relied substantially upon the Cul-
pepper and Bowe decisions.
Unfortunately, this area of law becomes somewhat clouded as
a result of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Dewey v.
Reynolds Metals Company.14 In what has become one of the most
widely written about decisions under Title VII, Judge Weick indi-
cated that the plaintiff could not maintain an action in court for
being discharged after refusing to work overtime on Sundays, fol-
lowing the resort by the parties to an arbitration determination which
concluded that the discharge was proper under the terms of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. 15
The court first determined that the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission was without authority to adopt regulations which
would compel an employer to accede to or accommodate the religious
beliefs of all of his employees since the first amendment's establish-
ment clause deprives the government of the power to support or
assist any religion; further the regulations could not in any event be
10421 F, 2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
" Hutchings v. United States Industries, Inc., 428 F. 2d 303, 313 (5th Cir. 1970),
12 Id.
Ild. at 311.
14429 F. 2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970) rehearing donied, 429 F. 2d 324, (6th Cir. 1970), %f'd
per curiam, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
[Vol. 22:72
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retroactively applied to the discharge of an employee occurring prior
to their issuance.16 Judge Weick saw the question as whether the
plaintiff had the right to impose his religious beliefs on the employer
and interfere with the operation of the plant." Further, "The funda-
mental error of Dewey and the Amici Curiae is that they equate
religious discrimination with failure to accommodate. We submit
these two concepts are entirely different.' 9
The Judge continued by indicating the importance of the volun-
tary settlement of labor disputes through collective bargaining and
indicated that once the grievance was submitted to arbitration, the
arbitrator's award was to be as final, binding and conclusive as a
judgment of a court. 19 It was his feeling that "The purpose of arbi-
tration is thwarted if the awards are held by the courts to be binding
on employers only and not on employees. '20
Because the United States Supreme Court in a 4-4 divided
opinion 1 affirmed the circuit decision, Dewey has had a tremendous
effect upon this area of the law. In the numerous law review articles
22
concerning the case, it has variously been concluded that the decision
turns upon the theories of collateral estoppel, res judicata and elec-
tion or choice of remedies. In any case, because of the decision, the
result on this question of law tended and to a degree still tends to
depend on the geographic area in which the affected individuals
reside. 3
Three additional Sixth Circuit determinations merit considera-
tion because of the effect they have had upon the Dewey question. In
Newman v. Aveo Corp., Aerospace Structures Division,U the Sixth
16id at 335.
17 Id.
19 Id. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying upon a recent EEOC regulation concerning
religious discrimination, 29 C. F. R. i1605.l, and upon Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
425 (1971), has recently indicated that an employer does indeed have a duty to attempt to
make reasonable accommodations to a job applicant's religious preferences, unless a business
hardship exists. Reid v Memphis Publishing Co., 5 E. P. D. 8013, (6th Cir. Dec.
18, 1972).
191d. at 337.
20 Id.
21 Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689 (197 1).
2 Comment, Civil Rights - Civil Rights Act of 19 6 4 - Employer Held To Have Engaged
In Religious Discrimination Under Title VII Iitbout Proof Of Discriminatory Intent,
44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1147 (1969); Comment, Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.: Labor
Arbitration and Title VII, 119 U. PENN. L. REv. 684 (1971); Comment, Religious
Discrimination In Employment- Dewey v. Reynols Metals Co., 429 F. 2d 324 (6th Cir.
1970), 1971 U. TOL, L. Rrv. 423 (1971); Note, Title ViI-Religious Discrimination
In Ensployment-Is "Effect On Individual Religious Belief' Discrimination Based on
Religion Under The Civil Rights Act Of 1964P, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 327 (1969).
"
4 See also, Spann v. Joanna Western Mills Co., 446 F. 2d 120 (6th Cir. 1971). See also,
Corey v. Avco Corp., 4. E. P D. 7912 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1972), cert denied, 5 E. P. D.
8099 (Jan. 8, 1973) indicating that recourse to arbitration, which had concluded that
the employer had no obligation to neommodate the religious preferences of employees,
barred further access to the courts.
24451 F. 2d 743 (6th Cir. 1971).
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Circuit Court of Appeals stated that an action brought by a dis-
charged Black employee claiming discrimination and being discharged
from a position for inefficiency without being afforded a training
period and further alleging a conspiracy on the part of his employer
and the union to maintain a racially discriminatory system was held
not to be barred by a prior determination of the arbitrator that the
discharge was justified. 2 The two factors which the court deemed
sufficiently different from Dewey were: (1) That the so-called
"choice" of resorting to arbitration was not a voluntary one, since
the contract in question had a mandatory arbitration clause (in ap-
parent exchange for a no-strike clause) and required the plaintiff to
proceed through each step of the machinery, the last of which was
arbitration. Failure to pursue each step to final conclusion would
automatically have rendered the discharge final. (2) That there was
nothing in the union contract giving the arbitrator authority to decide
the issue of race discrimination and further that it was not clear that
he had actually done so. Nowhere in the agreement was there a pro-
hibition against race discrimination in hiring or employment.'
Having made the above distinction, Judge Peck indicated that
Congress employed no language in Title VII which even intimates
support for the election of remedies doctrine and cited the earlier
decisions27 which declined to apply that doctrine to Title VII law
suits:
Private parties cannot by private contract deprive the
district court of jurisdiction thus conferred by federal
statute.
Further, we do not read Dewey as based upon the doc-
trine of election of remedies. [Citing numerous articles].
The majority opinion in this Court in Dewey did not so
characterize its reasoning. On the contrary, as has been indi-
cated it seems apparent that the second ground relied on for
the Decision in Dewey was the doctrine of estoppel.8
The court saw no reason to apply the estoppel doctrine in the
Newman case because of the aforementioned distinctions. To further
muddy the waters, on March 3, 1972, the Sixth Circuit handed down
the per curiam decision in Thomas v. Philip Carey Manufacturing
Company,3 ' which determined that an employee was not entitled
isNewman v. Aveo Corp., 451 F. 2d 743 (6th Cir. 1971).
26 id. at 748.
17 Id. at 747.
281. at 746, 747.
2' See also, the opinion in Parmer v. National Cash Register Co., 346 F. Supp. 1043 (S.D.
Ohio 1972), where Judge Carl M. Rubin indicated that ". . .the doctrine of election of
remedies does not exist in the area of Title VII complaints."
30455 F. 2d 911 (6th Cit. 1972).
[Vol. 22:72
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to maintain an action against the employer and the union because
he had previously filed and processed a grievance on the same claim
to arbitration, seeking reinstatement to his former job and classi-
fication with no loss in seniority and back pay, with all of the relief
except for back pay being granted. The court considered the case
"Clearly indistinguishable" from the Spann determination which re-
lied upon Dewey.1
Last, but certainly not least in this area of Sixth Circuit law, the
court handed down an opinion replete with obiter dicta in Cooper v.
Philip Morris Inc." The strict holding in Cooper was that a group
of Black employees was not considered to be barred from proceeding
under Title VII because they had previously chosen to litigate before
a state agency to a final determination on their claims, where the
state agency granted class relief to essentially the same class repre-
sented by plaintiffs in federal court and ordered restoration to jobs,
but denied back pay and attorneys' fees.33
The defendant-appellees contended before the Sixth Circuit that
the judge's grant of summary judgment should be affirmed on
grounds of (guess what) res judicata and collateral estoppel." The
district judge had concluded that the plaintiff's choice to litigate the
charges to a final adjudication under the state act was an election
of remedies binding upon the parties and precluding them from
maintaining the action under Title VII.11 He relied substantially upon
Dewey. The court of appeals indicated "that the alternative holding
in Dewey [that a final arbitration award barred relief] may be
argued in support of the district judge's holding, But, of course, we
do not deal here with arbitration or the great federal interest in
strengthening and maintaining its effectiveness."'"
The circuit opinion then went on to indicate that the doctrine of
election of remedies was "squarely rejected" in Newman v. Avco
Corp.
We also agree with the conclusion of the Fifth, Sixth
and Eighth Circuits that the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel do not bar appellant as a matter of law.
[Citing Hutchings and Tipler v. E. 1. DuPont et al, 443 F.
2d 125 (6th Cir., 1971) and other cases] ... but see Dewey
v. Reynolds Metals Company. ... 11
31 Thomas v. Philip Carey Mfg. Co., 455 F. 2d 911, 912 (6th Cir, 1972).
32464 F. 2d 9 (6th Cir. 1972).
33Cooper v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 464 F. 2d 9, 14 (6th Cit. 1972).
34Id. at 10.
35 Id.
36 Id.
17Id. at 11.
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The Court wrapped up by indicating the basis of its conclusion:
By what we have said to this point we do not mean to
suggest that our reversal and remand of this case is an
obvious conclusion or to deny that there is dictum in some
ease law which may be cited as persuasive of a contrary
result. Cf Dewey, supra; Spann v. Kaywood Division,
Joanna Western Mills Company.3 8
Admittedly, the Cooper case deals not with a "choice" between
private contract-grievance procedures and Title VIT, but rather with
two statutory remedies provided by state and federal law, Unfor-
tunately, it does not appear to this writer that we have seen the last
of the implications of Dewey v. Reynolds Metals and its progeny, at
least in the Sixth Circuit.
A presentation of the logical considerations on these issues may
be found in the Fifth Circuit decision in Rios v. Reynolds Metals
Companj," where the court held that an arbitration award upholding
the denial of a promotion to a Mexican-American employee could not
bar the employee's suit claiming that the denial was due to national
origin basis. 0 The Rios Court held that a federal district court was
the final arbiter in cases involving Title VII rights, but that it could
under limited circumstances exercise its discretion to defer to a
prior arbitration award. 41 Such deferral was to be made only if the
contractual rights coincide with rights under Title VII and the arbi-
tration decision was not violative of the private rights guaranteed
by that law. In addition, the appellate court indicated that the trial
court must be satisfied that:
(1) the factual issues before it are identical to those
decided by the arbitrator; (2) the arbitrator had power
under the collective agreement to decide the ultimate issue
of discrimination; (3) the evidence presented at the arbital
hearing dealt adequately with all factual issues; (4) the
arbitrator actually decided the factual issues presented to
the Court; (5) the arbitration proceeding was fair and
regular and free of procedural infirmities.
The burden of proof in establishing these conditions of limitation
was to be upon the defendant although the Rios tribunal indicated
in a footnote that its holding "may be somewhat in line" with the
cases evolving in the Sixth Circuit and citing particularly Newman
SId.
'332 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D. Tex. 197t), revd & remanded 467 F. 2d 54 (5th Cir, 1972).
a Rio5 v. Rcynolds Metals Co.,: 467 F, 2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972).
41 Id. at 58.
42 Id.
[Vol. 22:72
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v. Aveo Corp." It is to be hoped that the common sense approach of
the Fifth Circuit will have some more definite influence upon further
decisions out of this circuit."
Despite Dewey, the Sixth Circuit has ruled in Tipler v. DuPont
Company," that in an action under Title VII against an employer
by a discharged Black employee who earlier had unsuccessfully liti-
gated before the NLRB the issue of whether or not he had been dis-
charged in violation of the Labor Management Relations Act, that
the federal district court had properly refused to reconsider its denial
of the employer's motion for summary judgment, notwithstanding
arguments that the action was barred by collateral estoppel, res
judicata or judicial estoppel. The court concluded it would be inap-
propriate to apply collateral estoppel or res judicata since because
of differences between the Taft-Hartley Act and Title VII, the
NLRB hearing did not adequately consider all of the factors neces-
sary for a Title VII violation.4 Further, the court concluded that
the legislative history of the Acts supports the conclusion that an
individual may proceed under both Acts.
4 7
Concurrent Jurisdiction With General Civil Rights Acts
In line with the theory employed in Tipler v. DuPont,48 the
courts are now also holding that it is possible to challenge the denial
of federally protected rights, such as those under Title VII in the
federal courts, independently of the complex requirements of Title
VII. The Civil Rights Acts of the years 1866 and 1871 have been held
to create causes of action to redress deprivations concerning denials
of equal employment. A part of the Civil Rights Act of the year
1866 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence,
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
43 Id. at 59.
44 For a case holding to the contrary and adopting "in their entirely" the viewb of Judge
Weick expressed in Dewey, see Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012 (D.
Col. 1971), aff'd per curiun 466 F. 2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972).
45443 F. 2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971).
'6 Tipler v. DuPont Co., 443 F. 2d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1971).
41ld. at 128. In Bo/es v. Union Camp Corp., 5 E. P. D. T 8051 (Nov. 10, 1972), she
Southern District of Georgia ruled, inter daia, that a Title VII action was not pre-empted
by the National Labor Relations Act's jurisdiction and that no remedy tnder that Act
precludes resort to any civil rights enactment. The court also determined that defendant
company's agreement with the Office of Federal Contract Compliance on disciminatory
practice elimination was not a defense to the Title VII action by employees.
45 Id.
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White citizens and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind and
to no other.49 [Italics added]
The courts, in construing this statute, relied heavily upon the
determination of the United States Supreme Court in Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Company," in which the court concluded that 42 U.S.C. §1982
(concerning the right of all citizens to have the same right to inherit,
lease, sell, and convey real property as is enjoyed by white citizens)
was based not upon the fourteenth amendment, but the thirteenth
amendment and therefore, did not require state action; accordingly,
the statute applied to private, as well as public, discrimination in the
rental and sale of housing. Further, the Jones Court determined that
the Fair Housing Title of the Civil Rights Act, Title VIII, did not
pre-empt or preclude the use of §1982.51
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Waters v.
Wisconsin Steel Works of International Harvester,2 analogized §1981
to its sister statute and the determination in the Jones case, since
both were derived from section I of the Civil Rights Act of the year
1866 and accordingly valid exercises of Congressional power under the
thirteenth amendment. The court indicated that §1981 was intended
to prohibit private racial discrimination in employment and further
that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act did not repeal §1981 by
implication. 3 However, the Waters Court indicated that the parties
were required to exhaust their administrative remedies with EEOC
before proceeding to litigate under 42 U.S.C. §1981 unless they could
provide a reasonable excuse for their failure to do so.
Because of the strong emphasis which Congress placed
upon conciliation, we do not think that aggrieved persons
should be allowed intentionally to by-pass the Commission
without good reason. We hold, therefore, that an aggrieved
person may sue directly under §1981 if he pleads a reason-
able excuse for his failure to exhaust EEOC remedies. We
need not define the full scope of this exception hereM
Other circuit courts of appeal have followed the essential line
of the Waters decision without holding that there is a need to exhaust
the administrative remedy under Title VII to bring a private civil
"' CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1866, 42 U.SC. §1981 (1964).
30 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
" Jones v. Alfred M. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 415 (1968).
52427 F. 2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S, 911 (1970),
53 Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l. Harvester, 427 F. 2d 476, 485 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
' ld. at 487.
[Vol. 22: 72
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rights action under §1981 or to show a reasonable excuse for the
failure to do so. As the Third Circuit indicated in Hackett v. McQuire
Brothers :55
The national public policy reflected both in Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and in §1981 may not be frus-
trated by the development of overly technical judicial doc-
trines of standing or election of remedies.56
One district court, in concluding that a §1981 suit could be
brought without prior resort to Title VII litigation, commented that:
According to defendant's argument, in order for the
plaintiff to preserve both claims, she would have had to com-
mence two separate prosecutions when she was informed
that she would not be fired. She would have had to file a
charge with the EEOC and a lawsuit under section 1981.
Certainly this sort of prosecutorial redundancy is not what
Congress intended. Congress has provided several methods
for the vindication of claims of racial discrimination. Allow-
ing defendant to parry plaintiff's effort for redress via litiga-
tion with the latter's prior attempt at administrative relief
is simply contrary to our national commitment to end racial
discrimination.57
Essentially then, these courts have held that §§1981 and 1983
create parallel remedies to Title VII and that the enactment of Title
VII in no way repealed the previously existing "general" Civil Rights
Acts of the years 1866, 1870 and 1871.
In October 1971 the Sixth Circuit ruled in Johnson v. Cincinnati5s
that an action brought by a female applicant for city employment
alleging sex discrimination iii being refused an opportunity to make
application for an advertised position as housing inspector and seek-
ing relief under the Civil Rights Statutes of 1866 and 1871 (42
U.S.C. 1981 and 1983 respectively) should not have been dismissed
on the ground that the 1964 law (Title VII) pre-empted the dis-
crimination in employment field and, because Title VII at that time
excluded states and their political subdivisions, the municipality was
not required to answer in court for any alleged discrimination in
employment. Rather, the court indicated that enactment of Title VII
55Sanders v- Dobbs Houses, 431 F. 2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 948
(1971): Boudreaux v. Baron Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F. 2d 1011 (5th Cir.
1971); Young v. I. T. T., 438 F. 2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Hackett v Mcquie Bros., 445 F.
2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971); Brady v. Bristol Myers, 459 F. 2d 621 (8th Cir 1972); Payne v.
Ford Motor Co., 461 F. 2d 1107 (8th Cir. 1972).
-445 F. 2d 442, 447 (3d Cir. 1971).
'7Henderson v. First National Bank of Montgomery, 5 E. P. D. 8055, (M.D. Ala. May
29, 1972).
S450 F_ 2d 796 (6th Cir. 1971).
1973]
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does not preclude an action for discrimination under the previously
existing statutes,59 citing Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co." and the
above mentioned circuit courts of appeal decisions. 61 As the case indi-
cates these §1981 and §1983 actions have been especially valuable to
those who were formerly not covered by Title VII, such as educa-
tional employees, state and local government employees, or those
employed by an employer of fewer than 25 employees. They con-
tinue to be valuable in instances where for some reason the plaintiff
is unable to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements or prerequisites
to a Title VII action.62
Unfortunately, due to the wording of §1981 of Title 42 U. S.
C., several courts6 3 have held that it clearly does not state a claim
for relief in cases involving sex discrimination in employment. They
have relied substantially upon the wording of the statute and the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Georgia v. Rachel," in
which Mr. Justice Stewart discussed the legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.65
It seems fairly certain, despite the numerous attempts of EEOC
and other interested parties to apply § 1981 to employment discrimina-
tion cases on the basis of sex in private employment, that the
statute will not be interpreted by the courts to provide a remedy other
than in race discrimination cases. Interestingly enough, however, in
the case of Marlowe v. Fisher Body Division of General Motors Cor-
poration,6 6 the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
concluded that an employee claiming he was discriminated against in
employment because he was Jewish was entitled to bring court action
under the 1866 Civil Rights law despite the employer's claim that
the employee had alleged only religious bias.67 The court indicated
that the thirteenth amendment extends not only to Negroes:
"' Johnson v. Cincinnati, 450 F. 2d 796 (6th Cir. 1971).
60 392 U.S. 409, 415 (1968).
61 Johnson v. Cincinnati, 450 F. 2d 796, 797 (6th Cit. 1971).
62Se also, the opinion and order in Parmer v. National Cash Register Co., 346 F. Supp
1043 (S. D. Ohio 1972), opinion of Judge Rubin dared Feb. 9, 1972, p- 4; Sharma v.
Opportunities Indus, Center, 341 F. Supp. 209 (D. Wis. 1972).
63League of Academic Women v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 343 F. Supp. 636 (N. D. Cal.
1972); Williams v. San Francisco Unified Public School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N. D.
Cal. 1972); Braden v. Univ. of Pitt., 343 F. Supp. 836 (W. D. Pa. 1972); Fitzgerald Y.
United States Methodist Community Center, 335 F. Supp. 965 (D. Neb. 1972); Forst v.
First Nat'l Bank of Wash., 5 E. P. D. 8063 (D. D. C. Dec. 5, 1972).
64384 U.S. 780 (1966).
65See also. Dubose v. Kenton County Airport Bd., Inc., 4 F, P. D. 7910 (F. D .Ky. 1972)
(denying jurisdiction under §1983 on a complaint by a male employee alleging discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex, essentially on the theory that nothing in said statnte proscribes
wage discrimination on account of sea).
5 E. P. ID. 17963 (E. D. Mich. 1972).
67 Marlowe v. General Motors Corp., 5 E. P. D. 1 7963 (E. D. Mich. 1972).
[Vol. 22.72
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General Motors argues that the plaintiff has alleged
only religious discrimination. Without entering too far into
the rather esoteric dispute as to whether discrimination
against Jews is on account of race or religion, this Court is
satisfied that when dealing with the prejudices of man
against his fellows, the broadest possible meaning should be
accorded to those statutes designed to remedy such inequi-
ties. It has been argued that prejudice against Jews is of
necessity religious prejudice. But this runs counter to ex-
perience. Its virulence is so strong that it extends to such
attitudes well beyond religious beliefs and thus its epithets
have become racial also."
Class Actions and Standing
It is well settled that in this area of civil rights litigation the
complaint often goes beyond direct and immediate injury to an indi-
vidual and therefore could, and in some cases should, lead to relief
for all of those who are similarly situated. Indeed, as has been re-
marked in the opinion in Parmer v. National Cash Register Com-
pany," the availability of class action suits under Title VII is no
longer subject to question.7" In addition, numerous suits have explicitly
indicated that class actions are appropriate in sex discrimination
suits under Title VII. 1 Although Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that the scope of the class be determined as soon
as practicable in order to allow a full defense, the Sprogis Court held
that the determination that the discrimination alleged is based on a
class characteristic can be made in an individual case and class relief
can be fashioned later, even if the suit was not pleaded as a class ac-
tion. 2 Relief was therein found to be available to all those steward-
esses terminated because of United Airline's illegal no-marriage rule
and the Seventh Circuit held that the effect of Title VII is not diluted
when only a portion of a protected class is discriminated against. 3
In Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Company" the Seventh Circuit
determined that it was not necessary for each member of a class of
I5 d,
6' 346 F. Sopp. 1043 (S. D. Ohio 1972).
F armer v. Nat'l Cach Register Co., 346 F. Supp. 1043 (S. D. Ohio 1972). The cases cited
in Parmer as support for this conclusion are Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426
(1971); Tipler v. E. I. DuPont & Co., 443 F. 2d 125, 130 (6th Cir. 1971); Jenkins v.
United Gas Co., 400 F. 2d 28 (5th Cit. 1968); Mack v. General Electric Co., 329 F.
Supp. 72 (E. D. Pa. 1971).
1 See Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc. 444 F. 2d 1194, 1201 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 991 (1971); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F. 2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971);
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F. 2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
2 Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F. 2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991(1971).
73 Id. See, 56 F. R. D. 420 (N. D. 111. 1972), where the district court, on remand, held that
class relief was not appropriate in the individual circumstances therein stated.
11416 F. 2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
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employees complaining of unlawful employment discrimination to file
charges with EEOC as a prerequisite to a civil suit and further that
a suit of employment discrimination based on sex could be treated
properly as a class action as to all forms of relief to which any of
the members of the class were entitled:
A suit for violation of Title VII is necessarily a Class
action as the evil sought to be ended is discrimination on
the basis of a Class characteristic, i.e. race, sex, religion or
national origin. In our view, it is indistinguishable on this
point from actions under Title II relating to discrimination
in public accommodations. 75
This approach has not been adopted by all of the district courts
that have considered the opinion.76
In Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,77 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals has recently held that the dismissal of an individual liti-
gant's complaint where class relief had been sought did not require
dismissal of the class action, even though there was no proper repre-
sentative to maintain the suit. Rather, the court remanded the class
action to the trial court for it to be maintained on the docket "for a
reasonable time" to permit the presentation of any proper claims for
relief under the class action.
On the issue of standing, the Fifth Circuit concluded in Johnson
v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,78 that the trial court had im-
properly ruled that a complainant seeking relief from alleged em-
ployment discrimination could only represent in a class action other
discharged Negro employees. The appellate court indicated that since
the complainant had sought relief "across the board" against unequal
employment practices alleged to have been committed by the em-
ployer pursuant to a policy of race discrimination, a class action on
behalf of all Black workers was appropriate. In addition, the trial
court had committed error in refusing to allow the individual to
represent the class until he had proved his own right to relief. It was
sufficient that the complainant was a member of the class, that is a
discharged Black employee, and his claim of race discrimination was
typical of the claims of the class. 0
7' Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F. 2d 711, 719 (7th Cit. 1969).
70Seo Parmer v. National Cash Register Co., 346 F. Supp. 1043 (S. D. Ohio 1972).
77 5 E. P. D. 8093 (4th Cit. Dec. 29, 1972).
78417 F. 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
7' Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F. 2d 1122, 1224-25 (5th Cit. 1969).
1 A contrary approach has admittedly been followed by a district court ruling in Forst v.
First Nat'l Bank of Wash., 5 E. P. D. 8063 (D. D. C. Dec. 5, 1972). There Judge Gasch,
recognizing case law to the contrary, stated chat a former bank teller could not adequately
represent the class of female tellers because she had resigned prior to the litigation and
moved several hundred miles away.
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In a similar vein, the District Court for the Northern District
of Mississippi concluded in Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc.,' that plain-
tiffs bringing a class suit alleging that the employer had discrimina-
torily refused to hire them were also entitled to allege and seek to
enjoin unlawful employment practices in the internal operations of
the employer, even though such practices were not directly injurious
to them at the time of their application for employment. Requiring
plaintiffs to start anew to remove racial discriminatory internal
practices after they had removed those "at the door" would result in
a multiple number of suits and a waste of time and money for all
parties.82
In Hackett v. McGuire Brothers, Inc.," the Third Circuit con-
cluded that a former employee who had received a deferred pension
was nonetheless a "person claiming to be aggrieved" within the Act,
42 U.S.C. §2000-e-5 and was not deprived of standing to bring an
action in his own right and as a class representative, even though
he did not fall under the definition of employee within §701 (f) of the
Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000-e(f) as "an individual employed by an
employer.""
Agency Investigatory Powers and Scope of Complaint as
Affecting Same
Several cases85 have held that the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission has a very wide use of its investigatory powers
and various circuit courts of appeals have held that a Commissioner
Charge need not detail the evidence on which it was based in order
to support a commission investigation, but rather need only allege
81295 F. Supp. 1281 (N. D. Miss. 1969), ajJ'd, 423 F. 2d 57 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied
without opinion (5th Cit. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 951 (1970).
tt Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Miss. 1969), aff'd, 423 F. 2d 57 (5th
Cir.), rehearing denied without opinion, 2 E. P. D 10162 (5th Cit. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 951 (1970).
11445 F. 2d 442 (3d Cit. 1971).
84Hackett v. McGuire Brothers, Inc., 445 F. 2d 442, 445 (3d Cit. 197 1). See also, Arkansas
Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. of Portland, Arkansas, 446 F. 2d 763 (8th Cir. 1971) indicating
that although an association of public school teachers was not technically itself an individual
member of a class of Black teachers who were allegedly discriminated against on the basis
of race, it still had standing as a proper party to bring a suit seeking relief for the class of
Black teachers; Parmer v. NatI Cash Register Co., 346 F. Supp. 1043 (S. D. Ohio 1972)
(former employee plaintiff has standing to represent class of women which indudes present
employees of defendant company and present members of defendant local union).
'B Bowaters Southern Paper Corp. v. EEOC, 428 F. 2d 799 (6th Cir., 1970), rehearing denied
without opinion, 2 E. P. D. 10240, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970); Blue Bell Boots
v. EEOC, 418 F. 2d 355 (6th Cir. 1969); Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 439 F. 2d 239
(9th Cir. 1971); United Nuclear-Homestake Partners v. EEOC, 461 F. 2d 1055 (10th
Cit. 1972); Adolph Coors v. EEOC., 4 E. P. D. 7932 (10th Cir. Aug. 7, 1972), cert.
filed, (U.S. Dec. 7, 1972), Civil No. 72-845; Mountain States T & T Co. v. EEOC., 4
E. P. D. 7933, (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 1972).
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the practices believed to be unlawful.86 Further, the district court in
Ostapowiecz v. Johnson Bronze Company,7 held that employment
practices predating the enactment of Title VII by as much as five
years and those practices maintained in departments of the employer
other than the one in which the complainant worked, were properly
subject to EEOC's inquiry into alleged sex discrimination and the
employer may be made to answer interrogatories seeking information
on such practices. 8
In Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc.," the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, after finding that an individual was not barred from in-
cluding in her court complaint national origin discrimination allega-
tions despite the facts that her original charge specified sex dis-
crimination and that amendment of the charge to so specify was made
after the then statutory period for filing charges, went on to discuss
the scope of the EEOC complaint and stated that it should not be
strictly limited.2 In citing an earlier Georgia district court opinion,
King v. Georgia Power Company,1 the Sanchez Court stated that the
allegations in a Court Complaint filed pursuant to Title VII:
Many encompass any kind of discrimination like or re-
lated to allegations contained in the charge and growing
out of such allegation during the pendency of the case before
the Commission. (Citation omitted). In other words the
scope of the Judicial Complaint is limited to the "scope" of
the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected
to grow out of the Charge of discrimination."1 [Italics added]
This question of the scope of the EEOC investigation as based
upon charges filed was questioned initially in the more recent opinion
from the same circuit in Tedford v. Airco Reduction, Inc.,93 where
the appeals court stated that the trial court had no legal jurisdiction
to consider allegations newly advanced before the court concerning
discriminatory seniority systems and preferential driver's lists, since
those allegations went far beyond the scope of the charge of discrimi-
nation in hiring that was filed with EEOC. The court reasoned that
it was the intent of Congress that EEOC be given the chance to
investigate and conciliate charges as a prerequisite to litigation in
6 id.
754 F. R. D. 465 (W. D. Pa. 1972).
88 Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 54 F. K. D. 465 (W. D. Pa. 1972).
81431 F 2d 455 (5th Cir.), rkgaring denied pei, eui,,ia, 431 F. 2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970).
91 Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F. 2d 455 (5th Cit.) rehearing denied per efriam,
431 F. 2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970).
1 295 F. Supp. 943 (N. D. Ga. 1968).
9Sanchez v, Standard Brands, lin., 431 F. 2d 455, 466 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied per
curiain, 431 F. 2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970), See also, Jones v. Still-Man Mfg., Inc., 5 E. P. D.
8020 (S. D. N. Y. Oct 16, 1972) (amendment of complaint of race discrimination to
include an allegation of retaliation - harassment concerning opposition to unlawful
practices involving sex discrimination).
"4 E. P. D. 7654 (5th Cit. 1972).
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court and therefore the charging party could not by-pass the agency
on these allegations. 4 The court at that time found nothing incon-
sistent in that holding with the Sanchez decision.
Two months later in the same case, the court handed down a two
paragraph per curiam decision stating that the earlier decision had
been based on incomplete argument and that since there was no
longer a controversy between the original parties the determination
was vacated and the earlier opinion withdrawn. The Department
of Justice had urged reconsideration of the decision because it had
asserted that the decision restricted EEOC's investigative authority.
The court concluded that the original decision "May be of questionable
precedential value" because it was based on incomplete arguments
that did not fully articulate the government interest. 6 It would ap-
pear that the effect of the latter determination is to keep intact the
Sanchez holding as the EEOC's expanding role in investigating
complaints.
Prerequisites to Title VII Action
In another much-litigated area of procedural technicalities, sev-
eral courts have held that there are only two prerequisites to the
filing of a Title VII action in federal court, namely: (1) The timely
filing with the commission of a charge within the time period provided
by law under former §706(d). 90 days on non-deferrable issues and
210 days after the alleged unlawful practice last occurred or within
30 days of the state or local agency termination of proceedings,
whichever is earlier (changed by amended §706 (e) to 180 days after
the alleged unlawful practice on non-deferrable issues or 300 days on
deferrable issues or 30 days after the state has terminated its pro-
ceedings, whichever is earlier) ; (2) and secondly, the timely filing
of a court action upon receipt of the notice by the Charging Party
from the commission authorizing him or her of his or her right to
sue (under former §706(e), a period of 30 days, which is changed
by newly enacted §706 (f) (1) to a period of 90 days from the receipt
of the notice). One of the fairly recent decisions analyzing these pre-
requisites and rejecting other so-called prerequisites to a Title VII
action was the decision of Watson v. Limbach Company."
In the opinion by Judge Carl B. Rubin," there is considerable
discussion of the case law concerning the various contentions raised
by defendant therein, which included an allegation that a finding of
"treasonable cause" by the EEOC under §706(a) was a jurisdictional
4 Tedford v. Airco Reduction, Inc., 4 E. P. D. 7654 (5th Cir. 1972).
"
5 Tedford v. Airco Reduction, Inc., 4 E. P. D. 7776 (5th Cir. 1972).
96 1 d.
9"333 F. Supp. 754 (S. D. Ohio 1971).
"Watson v. Limbach Co., 333 F. Supp. 754 (S. D. Ohio 1971).
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prerequisite for the filing of a civil suit. In that case, the agency had
made no such finding prior to the time that plaintiff had filed the
complaint and defendant moved for dismissal on that basis. The
court cited numerous Title VII cases" for the proposition that a find-
ing of reasonable cause by the agency is not a prerequisite to the
institution of a private action under the Act.
Defendants in the Watson case also asserted as a ground for a
motion to dismiss that the court lacked jurisdiction over the action
because the agency had not beer given a chance to obtain "voluntary
compliance," as indicated by §§706 (a) and 706 (e). 10 The court indi-
cated that such assertion was incorrect both as an issue of fact in
that case and as a matter of law.0 ' The defendants were in effect
arguing that the plaintiffs should not have been allowed to file suit
until the agency had completed its conciliation efforts and informed
the plaintiff that it had been unable to obtain voluntary compliance.0 2
Citing Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company,"' and
Miller v. International Paper Company,104 the Watson decision re-
jected this view.1t' The court in Johnson v. Seaboard Airline Railroad
Company,"' concluded that these sections mean only that the Com-
mission must be given an opportunity to persuade before an aggrieved
person may resort to court action. In Johnson, the court further con-
cluded that an aggrieved individual may file a suit in federal court
when he has received the statutory notice from the Commission and
need not await an actual attempt by the Commission to achieve
voluntary compliance. 07
One trial court determination seems to place a more exacting
standard on this question of administrative prerequisites to action
upon EEOC itself when it seeks to employ its newly acquired power
to directly litigate. In EEOC v. Container Corporation of America,'
District Judge Tjoflat concluded that the Commission must satisfy
99Dent v. St. Louis -San Francisco Ry., 406 F. 2d. 399 (5th Cir, 1969); Miller v. Int'l
Paper Co., 408 F. 2d 282 (5th Cit. 1969); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F. 2d
888 (5th Cit. 1970). See also, Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Constr. Co., 437 F. 2d 1136
(5th Cir. 1971); Flowers v. Laborer's Local 6, 431 F. 2d 205 (7th Cir. 1970); Fekete v.
United States Steel Corp., 424 F. 2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444
F. 2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
10 Watson v. Limbach Co., 333 F. Supp. 754 (S. D. Ohio 1971).
"I Id. at 761.
1111d. at 762.
102406 F. 2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969).
408 F. 2d 282 (5th Cir. 1969).
105Watson v. Limbach Co., 333 F. Supp. 754 (S. D. Ohio 1971).
106405 F. 2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969).
"'
t Johnson v. Seaboard Airline R. R., 405 F. 2d 645 (4th Cit. 1968), cart. denied, 349 U.S.
918 (1969). Accord, Jefferson v. Peerless Pumps Hydrodynamic, 456 F. 2d 1359 (9th Cir.
1972).
'"5 E. P. D. 8014, (M. D. Fla- Oct. 13, 1972).
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all of the steps in the administrative process prior to litigation and
that a mere statement in the complaint that all conditions precedent
had been satisfied justified dismissal of the action. Whether other
courts will adopt this approach and thus place a higher standard
upon the agency than upon private litigants on this question remains
to be seen.
Statutes of Limitations on the Filing of a Charge and
Filing of Court Action
A substantial number of Title VII decisions have dealt with the
problem of the statutory periods for the filing of charges with the
agency and for the filing of court action. As above indicated, until
the March 24-25, 1972 amendments, the period of time for filing a
charge with the agency was 90 days after the last known act of dis-
crimination in the case of matters which were not deferrable to a
state or local agency and 180 days after such period on deferrable
issues or 80 days after the state or local agency had terminated its
proceedings, whichever came earlier."' The amendments under
§706(e),110 changed this to 180 days (non-deferrable issues) and 300
days after the alleged practice, or within 30 days after receiving
notice that the state or local agency has terminated its proceedings,
whichever is earlier (on deferrable issues).
Several cases have held that the statute of limitations as above
set out for filing of charges could be expanded or tolled when deal-
ing with continuing acts of discrimination. In Cox v. United States
Gypsum Company,' the appellate court concluded that a layoff, as
opposed to a discharge or quitting, suggested a possibility of re-
employment and the filing of a charge claiming "continuing" dis-
crimination suggested a claim there had been subsequent recall or
new hiring which discriminated against the charge maker.11 2 These
factors, among others, militated determination that the charges,
being of a continuing nature, were timely filed under the circum-
stances in that case. 3 The well reasoned commentary in Watson v.
Limbach,7 4 discusses various cases which have held that Title VII
actions may not be dismissed on the grounds that the charges were
untimely filed where the suit challenges the maintenance of an
allegedly discriminatory system rather than one isolated instance
"'See former § 706 (d), CIVL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000-e-3 (d) (1970).
u PUB. L. No. 92-261, §4(a) (Mat. 24, 1972).
1 409 F. 2d 289 (7th Cir.), rehearing denied, 409 F. 2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969).
"
2 Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F. 2d 289 (7th Cir.), rehearing denied, 409 F. 2d
289 (7th Cir. 1969).
11 Accord, Boudreaur v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F. 2d 1011 (5th Cit.
1971); Richard v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 5 E. P. D. T 8059, (8th Cit. Dec. 4, 1972).
114333 F. Supp. 754, 765 (S. D. Ohio 1971).
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citing Cox and other cases, including Ohio cases such as EEOC v.
United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices,' and Dobbins v.
Local 212 IBEW.'
An overly large number of cases have concerned themselves
with the statute of limitations concerning filing of a Title VII com-
plaint in federal court. Many, if not most, have dealt with the issue
of whether the filing of the notice of right to sue received from the
agency and an affidavit-application in forma pauperis (requesting
that the court appoint counsel and authorize institution of litigation
without pre-payment of costs, fees, or security) are sufficient ac-
tivities on the part of the plaintiff to toll the statute of limitations
for filing the complaint. Many cases"' have held that such action
constitutes sufficient compliance with the requirement of the Act
for timely filing or, in the alternative, that such action tolls the
statute of limitations.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Harris v. National
Tea Company"8 affirmed the dismissal under circumstances where
the trial court had, after two applications for appointment of counsel,
finally made the appointment for the pauper, but the complaint
when finally filed was 85 days after the receipt of the notice of right
to sue and the appeals court held that the 30 day period for filing
after receipt of the right to sue notice then provided for by §706(e)
must be strictly construed and that the petition to the district court
for appointment of counsel and waiver of costs, being filed along
with the right to sue notice, did not satisfy the requirement of filing
within 30 days. Fortunately, the Sixth Circuit in the case of Harris
v. Walgreen's Distribution Center,"9 held that the Act authorizes
federal courts to appoint counsel and may authorize commencement
of an action without payment of fees or costs. Plaintiff, like Harris
in the Seventh Circuit case, had applied twice for appointment of
counsel, but he had been denied appointment twice. The appeals
court held that the district court apparently took into account the
Commission finding of no probable cause and that such had been a
"s311 F. Supp. 464 (S. D. Ohio 1970),rev'd on other grounds, 438 F. 2d 408 (6th Cir.
1971),cert. denied, 404 U.S. 832 (1971).
116292 F. Supp. 413 (S. D. Ohio 1968).
"'Witherspoon v. Mercury Freight Lines, Inc., 1 E. P. D. 9976 ( D. Ala. 1968), aff'd in
tart rev'd in part on other grounds. 457 F. 2d 496 (5th Cit. 1972); Prescod v. Ludwig
Indus., 325 Y. Supp. 414 (N. D. 111. 1971); Shaw v. Nat'l Tank Co., 3 E. P. D. 8234
(N.D. Okla. 1971); McQueen v. E. M. C. Plastic Co., 302 F. Supp. 881 (E D. Tex. 1969);
Austin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F. Supp. 1145 (E. D. Va. 1970); Gray v. Wilberforce
3 E. P. D. If 8183 (S. D. Ohio 1971); contra, Rice v. Chrysler Corp., 327 F. Supp. 80
(E. D. Mich. 1971); Harris v. Nat'l Tea Co., 4 E. P. D. 7595 (N. D. Ill. 1971), aff'd
454 F. 2d 307 (7th Cit. 1971).
118454 F. 2d 307 (7th Cit. 1971).
'"456 F. 2d 588 (6th Cir. 1972),
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factor in the denial of counsel by the trial court. "' The Sixth Circuit
indicated that the administrative determination by the agency of
no probable cause could not be the sole ground for denial of counsel. 12'
Judge George Edwards pointed out that Harris was within the 30-
day period when he first filed his motion for appointment for counsel:
There is a conflict between the legislative_ intent to provide
counsel where necessary to justice and the requirement that
the complaint be filed within 30 days after the EEOC notice
of right to sue. Obviously, a complainant able to hire a
lawyer might be able to file suit within the 30 days, while
one financially unable to do so was still petitioning the
court to appoint a lawyer for him. Obviously, too, the filing,
processing and decision of the motion for counsel could
consume the entire 30-day period,122
The court concluded by indicating that after the decision on the
motion for counsel, if the time remaining was unreasonably short
for securing the lawyer and filing the complaint, the district court
order granting or denying the motion for counsel should set a
reasonable time for filing of said complaint.' 2 Hopefully, in light
of this last named opinion and the fact that the new Act enlarges
the period for filing of a complaint after receipt of the notice of
right to sue to 90 days, this issue will not continue to take up the
amount of time that has been involved in litigation to date.
In Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Company, 24 the Fifth Circuit
handed down an opinion now famous in Title VII litigation as the
"Culpepper Doctrine." The court concluded that a suit alleging
employment discrimination could not be dismissed on the ground
that there had been a failure to file charges with the Commission
within 90 days from the date the alleged violations occurred when
the complainant attempted first in good faith to reach a private
settlement without litigation by pursuing contractual grievance pro-
cedures." 5 The statute of limitations was held to be tolled once the
employee invoked his contractual grievance remedies in a construc-
tive effort to seek a private settlement of his complaint.
2
It is also interesing to note the discussion in Toroekio v.
Chamberlain Mfg. Company,"' granting a motion of plaintiffs con-
120 Harris v. Waigreen's Disttib. Center, 456 F. 2d 588 (6th Cir. 1972).
121 Id. at 590.
Id. at 591.
I23 d. at 592.
4421 F. 26 888 (5th Cir. 1970)
125 Culpepper v. Rey olds Metals Co., 421 F. 2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
1'6 Id.
12456 F 2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1972), opinion on remand, 56 F. R. T) 82 (W. D. Pa. 1972).
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cerning leave to file an appeal from dismissal due to the failure of
their attorney to timely file a notice of appeal within 30 days as
required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and holding that
same was "excusable neglect" under the federal rules in light of
the attendant circumstances. 28
Procedures of Deferral
Another area of procedural difficulty concerns deferral pro-
cedures of the agency in being required to defer cases to state or
local agencies dealing with similar types of discrimination.129 The
United States Supreme Court ruled in the case of Love v. Pullman
Company,30 that the requirements of the Act were fulfilled by a
procedure whereby a charge filed with EEOC previous to the ex-
haustion of state remedies was referred by the Commission to the
state agency and then formally filed once the state agency indicated
it would decline to take action or after the expiration of the time
period provided by the Act.131 The conteotion that such a procedure
was a "manipulation" of the filing requirement, not contemplated or
permitted by the statute or by the commission regulations, was
rejected and the court stated that nothing in the Act suggests that
the state proceedings may not be initiated by EEOC acting on
behalf of the charging party, rather than by the charging party
himself; nor is there any requirement that the complaint to the
state agency be made in writing rather than by oral referral.32 Mr.
Justice Stewart stated that the complaint could be held by the Com-
mission "in suspended animation,"133 automatically filing it upon
termination of the state proceedings. To require a second "filing"
by the aggrieved person after termination of the state proceedings
would serve no purpose oiher than the creation of an additional
procedural technicality. "Such technicalities are particularly inap-
propriate in a statutory scheme in which laymen unassisted by
trained lawyers initiate the process. ' "ln
Concerning a related question, the Sixth Circuit has very re-
cently ruled that the fact that EEOC had not deferred an employee
charge of discrimination to state authorities because EEOC ques-
tioned the state agency's ability to provide relief could not be used
1231d. at 1087.
119 See former §706(b), now §706(c), CrviL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964,42 U. S. C. §2000-e-I (c)
(1970).
130404 U.S. 522 (1972).
I" Love v. Pullman Co. 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
13212. at 525.
13 Id. at 526.
131, at 527. See the similar conclusion reached ir Watson v. Limbach, 333 F. Supp. 754
(S. D. Ohio 1971) prior to the Supreme Court's reversal in Love of the Tenth Circuits
derision, criticizing said appeals decision as overly restrictive.
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as a basis for dismissing the court action for failure to exhaust the
state remedies.135 The court ruled in Mitchell v. Mid-Continent Spring
Company, that the matter must be sent back to allow the employee
to seek redress from state authorities. 36 The employee had never
filed a charge with the Kentucky Human Rights Commission after
filing her EEOC charge and the agency never referred the matter
to any state agency because in its belief, referral was not necessary
since EEOC concluded no agency in the state had adequate power
to grant relief. The Sixth Circuit ruled that the trial court should
retain jurisdiction of the suit to allow the complainant to seek re-
dress under the state statutes and indicated that the complainant
ought not to lose her cause of action because EEOC had failed in
referring her complaint to the state.
37
Largely based upon the Mitchell decision, Judge Thomas ruled
in Greer v. United Engineering and Foundry Company,' - that sum-
mary judgment was inappropriate when neither the plaintiff nor
EEOC had filed the complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commis-
sion prior to maintaining the action in court. He indicated that
although in Greer, EEOC has not contended that the state agency
did not have power to obtain relief as in Mitchell, that this factor
does not sufficiently distinguish that case from Greer:
The EEOC does not have the authority to divest those
states whose agencies have remedial powers of the oppor-
tunity to seek relief for their citizens. It is further evident
that Courts are loathe to deprive a complainant of his cause
of action because of the EEOC's failure to comply with
Statutory requirements.
39
The court denied the motion and retained jurisdiction long enough
to allow the plaintiff or EEOC to give notice to the state agency to
begin an investigation into the matter.
Another related area concerned a claim that a complaint of
discrimination should be dismissed because the claimant had filed
her charge with EEOC too soon, that is before the expiration of the
sixty (60) day period prescribed for a deferral to state agencies
under § 706(b) of the Act. In Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corpora-
tion,'40 the appeals court determined that the Title VII provision
that no charge could be filed by a complainant with EEOC prior to
354 E. P. D. 1 7940 (6th Cir. Aug. 11, 1972).
136 Id,
137 Id.
'" Civil No. 71-908 (N. D. Ohio Sept. 20, 1972).
'
9 Greer v. United Engineering and Foundry Co., Civil No. 71-908 (N. D. Ohio Sept 20,
1972), citing Love, Mitcbell and other cases.
14c452 F. 2d 889 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 1768 (1972).
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the expiration of the 60-day period allowed for deferral to the state
or local agency was intended to require only that EEOC defer to
state proceedings for a limited period of time in order to give the
state or local agency an opportunity to handle the problem under
state or local law and was not intended to be construed literally.141
Thus, a complaint was properly filed with EEOC four (4) days
after the commencement of proceedings on a charge of sex dis-
crimination with a state agency, so long as the state agency was
given the opportunity to resolve the problem within the statutory
period.
Size of Employer
Certain cases have been concerned with the identity of the
respondent and whether the respondent meets the test provided by
Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §2000-e(b) formerly indicated that the term
"employer" meant a person engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce who had 25 or more employees for each working day in each
of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year and went on to indicate certain exceptions, such as the govern-
ment or private membership clubs. Newly enacted §701(b) will
lower the number of employees needed within one year to 15 or
more employees and will eliminate the exemption for state or local
governments.
The size of the employer has often caused problems for con-
siderations of jurisdiction over a charge. In Hassell v. Harmon
Foods, Inc.,"' the court concluded that the Title VII action could
not be maintained against a firm that employed fewer than twenty-
five persons which did not have the requisite identity with its par-
ent corporation such that they constituted a single employer allow-
ing computation of the number of their employees to satisfy the
statutory requirement; the court reasoned that the affairs of the
two firms were handled separately and the parent was not liable for
the debts of the subsidiary with the subsidiary being recognized as
a separate firm for tax purposes.4
On the other hand, in Williams v. New Orleans Steamship As-
sociationj" the district court ruled for the purposes of Title VII
coverage that individual companies which made up a steamship as-
sociation of the employers were to be treated as a single employer
under the Act, where the association controlled employment on the
141 TVoutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F. 2d 89 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct.
1768 (1972).
4452 F. 2d 199 (6th Cir. 1972).
1 Hassell v. Harmon Foods, Inc., 452 F. 2d 199 (6th Cir. 1972).
114 341 F. Supp. 613 (E. D. La. 1972).
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waterfront and established uniform employment policies applicable
to all member companies, where it owned and operated the central
hiring hall and where it derived its authority by delegation from
the member companies.
14
Declining to rely by analogy upon Hassell v. Harmon Foods,
the District Court of Florida held in United States v. Jacksonville
Terminal Company,146 that a showing by some of the unions involved
that each of them represented fewer than twenty-five members [a
part of the definition for "labor organization" under 42 U.S.C.
§2000-e(e)] did not remove the court's jurisdiction. The court found
a "substantial identity" between the defendant union members in
the terminal's employ and the various international organizations
and therefore determined they were indistinguishable under the act.
Remedies
Section 706(g) of the Act,'47 indicates that if the court finds that
the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is engaging in an
unlawful employment practice, the court may enjoin said practice
and order such affirmative action as is appropriate, which can in-
clude but is not limited to reinstatement or hiring, with or without
back pay, or any other equitable relief as the court deems appro-
priate. A new provision in the subsection limits back pay liability
so that it shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior
to the filing of a charge with the Commission. Further, interim
earnings shall operate to reduce the back pay allowable and no
order of court shall require the reinstatement of an individual or
membership in a union if the individual was refused said hiring
or admission for any reason other than discrimination covered by
the Act.
The courts have held that all those who are the victims of
discriminatory practices are to be included in the class afforded
monetary relief whether they have filed a charge with the Commis-
sion or not.'48 The rulings have indicated an obligation to provide
relief for all who are similarly situated.'49 It has been noted that
back pay is not a punitive measure, but rather an equitable measure
intended to restore the recipients to their rightful economic status
absent the effects of the unlawful discrimination."0
145 William v. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. La. 1972).
' 5 E. P. D. f 8066 (M. D. Fla. Nov. 29, 1972).
147 CIVIL RICHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000-e-5 (g) (1970).
148 Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F. 2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
14' Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F. 2d 1194 (7th Cir. 197 ).
Is Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F. 2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
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The Commission and the courts have held, in cases such as
Papermakers and Paperworkers, Local 189 v. United States,51 that
the establishment or maintenance of seniority lists or lists of pro-
gression based on minority status or sex, violate the Act where
plant wide seniority has been in effect. It may be possible to correct
a segregated seniority system merely by integrating the system.
However, where departmental or job seniority is a factor in deter-
mining transfers and promotions, additional adjustments may be
needed so as to eliminate the present effects of past discrimination.'
In Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation,5 3 the court ordered
that Black employees who exercised the right to transfer to pre-
viously all-White lines of progression should not be subjected to a
reduction in wages because they must accept an entry level position
in the previously all-White line. They were allowed to retain present
wage levels.5 4
In a suit brought by the U.S. Department of Justice under
§707(a) (concerning patterns or practices) the law was used to
remedy the discriminatory practices of Bethlehem Steel and the
United Steelworkers Union.155 The Second Circuit ordered that salary
retention and seniority carryover be made a part of the remedy so
as to provide incentive to transfer and thus eliminate the feature
of the present system which perpetuates past discrimination.1 5 6
Interestingly, in Local 2111, IBEW, v. General Electric Com-
pany,l57 Judge Kinneary ruled that where injunctive relief was no
longer appropriate since the discriminatory practice had been cor-
rected, nonetheless back pay damages could be awarded. The court
specifically rejected the contention that the Act does not permit the
awarding of damages except in conjunction with reinstatement or
hiring' and relied upon the district court decision in Robinson v.
Lorillard Corporation.9
151 416 F. 2d 980 (5th Cit. 1969), cert. denied, 397 US. 919 (1970).
152See, Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F. 2d 791 (4th Cit. 1971). See also the Fourth
Circuit Court of AppeaLs-recently held that the merger of seniority rosters previously
segregated on the basis of race could nor bar furtheFinunctive relief.-Blacks hired into the
racially segregated classification system were entitled to use company seniority to bid on
vacancies in crafts other than the one to which they were originally assigned; this "cross-
craft" relief was not to be denied on the basis that it required restructuring the seniority
system. United States v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co., 5 E. P. D. 8090( 4th Cit. Dec.
26, 1972).
152321 F. Supp. 1241 (E. D. La. 1970).
s
4Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 321 F. Supp. 1241 (E. D. La. 1970).
"'United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F. 2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
156 Id.
1574 E. P. D. 1 7614 (S. D. Ohio Dec. 3, 1971).
U8 Local 2111, IBEW v. General Electric Co., 4 E. P. D. M 7614 (S. D. Ohio Dec. 3, 1971).
151319 F. Supp 835 (M. D. N_ C_ 1970).
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A recent ruling indicates that a Black trainee discharged from
an entry level management position with Ford Motor Company had
not been given adequate training to perform the job in question and
accordingly his poor performance was due to the failure in training.
The court indicated that under said circumstances, the discharge
was improper and discriminatory; at this point in time, the court
has not determined a remedy, but conceivably the question of a train-
ing program might be involved though the named plaintiff does not
seek reinstatement. 160
As to attorney's fees, since vindication of the rights protected
by Title VII depends in large measure on private legal actions, it is
necessary to insure adequate legal counsel. Attorneys fees are neces-
sary if private counsel is to be an effective method of enforcement.
§706 (k)1 61 explicitly provides that such fees may be part of a remedy.
In Clark v. American Marine Corporation,5 2 a trial court held that
despite the fact that the defendant's good faith precluded plaintiffs'
receipt of back pay that plaintiffs were entitled to receive reasonable
attorney fees since they had acted as "private attorneys-general"
to enforce an important national policy. 63 The Fifth Circuit sus-
tained an award of $20,000 in fees. In a recent case in which it
was held that the individual plaintiff did not have a meritorious
claim for relief, nonetheless the attorneys representing her were
entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs as authorized by the
Act. 164
In the Robinson case,165 the Fourth Circuit held that attorneys
fees are to be imposed not to penalize defendants for pursuing
frivolous arguments, but to encourage individuals to vindicate a
congressional policy against race discrimination. It has been held
that a trial judge was within his discretion in awarding attorneys
fees of $15,000 to an attorney for successful representation of a
plaintiff on appeal of a significant case alleging sex discrimination. 66
Admissibility of Commission Files
Early in 1972 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down
a precedent-shattering opinion in Smith v. Universal Services Incor-
'0"Long v. Ford Motor Co., 5 F_ P_ D_ 8082 (F_ D_ Mich. Nov. 9, 1972). For a case con-
cerning required establishment of a training program and other significant relief, see EEOC
v. Plumbers Local 189, 5 F. E. P. C. 133 (S. D. Ohio Oct. 26, 1972).
1 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000-e-5 (k) (1970).
162 320 F. Supp. 709 (D). La. 1970), aff' per cturiam, 437 F. 2d 959 (Sth Cir. 1971).
13 Clark v, American Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709 (D. La. 1970),aff'd per curiam, 437
F. 2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971).
164 Fogg v. New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 346 F. Supp. 645 (D. N. H. 1972).
16 Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F. 2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
'"Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F. 2d 228 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Lea v.
Cone Mills Corp., 438 F. 2d 86 (4th Cit 1972).
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porated,"' which indicated that a report of the EEOC, consisting of
a summary of charges filed by the employee in question, a brief
review of the facts developed in the investigation and the Commis-
sion finding of probable cause, was admissible into evidence in the
employee's action in federal court. Since the report was prepared
in the regular course of the agency's business and in accordance
with the express statutory authority and was not compiled for pur-
poses of litigation only, it was admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule under the Federal Business Records Act.168 The court
reasoned that nothing in Title VII admittedly authorized the ad-
mission, but also that nothing in the statute prohibited the use of
the report in question. After rejecting a contention that the report
was immaterial, the court considered the hearsay question. Citing
a largely ignored opinion in the case of Gillin v. Federal Paper
Board Company,'" the court agreed with the finding there and the
contention of plaintiffs in the Smith case that the investigation
report is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule under the
federal statute.1 0
In Heard v. Mueller Company, 71 the Sixth Circuit ruled that
in view of the trial court grant of summary judgment dismissing a
portion of the complaint regarding the denial of assignment to a
vacant position, there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to
admit into evidence an EEOC investigation report pertaining to
the charge based on the denial of the position. Such information was
held not directly relevant to the remaining issues concerning alleged
continuing unfair practices.1 ' The court indicated that it was within
the sound discretion of the district court whether to accept the final
investigation report and analogized to the holding in Bridger v. Union
Railway Company,'i ' where there was a holding that it was within
the discretion of the trial court whether to accept an EEOC inves-
tigator as an expert witness.
The court indicated that since the contents of the report were
not directly relevant to the instant controversy before the court, in
that respect the case differed from Smith v. Universal Services, Inc.
74
Where the report was found to be highly probative of the
ultimate issues involved. [citation] Certainly, on the basis
167454 F. 2d 154 (5th Cir, 1972).
16828 U. S. C. §1732 (1964).
169 52 F. R. D. 383 (D. Conn. 1970).
170 Smith v. Universal Services, Inc., 454 F. 2d 154 (5th Cir.), rehering denied per cutiam,
4 E. P. D. 97704 (5th Cir. 1972).
171 462 F. 2d 190 (6th Cir. 1972)_
172 Heard v. Mueller Co., 462 F. 2d 190 (6th Cit. 1972).
173 355 F. 2d 382 (6th Cir. 1966).
17454 F. 2d 154 (5th Cif. 1972).
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of the case before us, we are not prepared to hold that all
EEOC investigation reports are per se admissible in every
Title VII action involving some or all of the same parties.
To the extent that the Smith case can be read to adopt
such a holding, we respectfully decline to adopt that
position."
On another front, the Fifth Circuit has ruled in Kessler v.
EEOC"6 that portions of the Act prohibiting the Commission, prior
to the institution of court action, from making public or furnishing
to the charging party and his attorney, information obtained as a
result of the investigation of the charge are intended to protect the
conciliation process, and any information may not be released prior
to the institution of court proceedings. Kessler has caused a great
deal of controversy and some degree of confusion within the Com-
mission as to the release of Commission file data to charging parties
and their counsel. Hopefully, that confusion will be alleviated by
the January 29, 1973 en bane reversal" 7 of the earlier decision, wherein
the appeals court now concludes that the statute, regulations and a
memorandum of the agency's former General Counsel indicate that
the charging party and his attorney are not members of the "public"
who would be denied access to the data "prior to the institution of
any proceeding"; accordingly, the information is available for pur-
poses of preparation of litigation.'
In Legal Aid Society v. Schultz,"' in an action brought pur-
suant to the Freedom of Information Act, 80 to require the Treasury
Department to make available EEO-l reporting forms (which show
composition of a company's work force by racial and ethnic minor-
ities) relating to the department's enforcement of Executive Order
No. 11246 (requiring affirmative action in minority employment by
government contractors), the district court ordered production de-
spite the claim that Title VII specifically exempts EEO-1's from
§709(e)18 production. The court reasoned that the section forbids
only officers and employees of EEOC from producing the documents
and further that the contractors whose EEO-1's were sought are
required to file them by the Executive Order; thus, Title VII does not
require the contractors to file the reports and §709 (e) is inapplicable.
1 Heard v. Mueller Co., 464 F. 2d 190, 194 (6th Cir. 1972); Accord, Cox v. Babcock and
Wilcox Company, 5 E. P. D. 8093 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 1972).
176Kessler v. EEOC, 53 F. R. D. 330 (5th Cir. 1972).
... Kessler v. EEOC, 5 E. P. D. 8423 (5th Cit. 1973),
178 ld.
1795 E. P. D. 8035, (N. D. Calif. Oct. 19, 1972).
1805 U. S. C. §552 (1964).
... CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U. S, C. §2000(e) -Se (1970).
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Use of Statistics
The Commission and courts have regularly held that statistics
showing that women and minorities are absent from or substantially
under represented in certain job classifications establishes a prima
face case of unlawful exclusion. The courts have adopted the Com-
mission analysis and have stressed the importance of statistical
proof.182 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has held that a statistical showing
that Blacks comprise only a small fraction of a company work force
and are primarily in menial jobs requires issuance of a preliminary
inj unction. 8 3
In Mabin v. Lear' Siegler, Inc., 8 4 this Sixth Circuit indicated:
We recognize that statistical information may be an ac-
ceptable method for determining the existence or absence
or racially prejudicial employment practices, Jones v. Lee
Way Motor Freight, Inc.; Parham v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Company, 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir., 1970).185
Right of Jury Trial
The courts have uniformly held under Title VII that there is
no right to a trial by jury under the Act since the remedies pro-
vided are essentially equitable in nature. In Williams v. Travenal
Laboratories, Inc.,86 the court determined that an action brought
alleging race discrimination and seeking class relief including dam-
ages for lost wages did not entitle the employer to a trial by jury.
The court reasoned that the demand for back pay under the Act
is not in the nature of a claim for damages but rather is a part of
the initial statutory equitable remedy to be determined through the
court's discretion, and not by a jury,8 7 citing Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc."' The Williams court went on to hold that
in view of the fact that the relief sought from alleged race dis-
crimination in employment under a 42 U.S.C. §1981 claim was the
same as the remedy available under Title VII, there was no legal
issue that would require a trial by jury. Further, the request for
102 United States v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 36, 416 F. 2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); Jones v.
Lee Way Motor Freight, 431 F. 2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cer. denied, 401 U.S. 954
(1971).
t83Hutchings v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 428 F. 2d 303 (1970). See also, Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 446 F. 2d 652 (2d Cir.
1971); Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C. D. Calif. 1970).
184457 F. 2d 806 (6th Cit. 1972).
185Mabin v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 457 F. 2d 806 (6th Cir. 1972).
186 344 F. Supp. 163 (N. D. Miss. 1972).
187 William v. Travenal Laboratories, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 163 (N. D. Miss. 1972).
185 417 F. 2d 1122 (5th Cil. 1969). See also, Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp.
1232 (N. D. Ga. 1968) rev'd on other grounds, 421 F 2d 888 (5th Cit. 1970).
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reinstatement and back pay did not present an issue for jury
consideration. 189
Despite the general approach negating the right to a jury panel
in Title VII suits, certain courts have authorized the use of an
"advisory jury" as provided by Rule 39(c), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.190 One appeals panel, which suggesting that the use of
such advisory juries "should be sparingly exercised," nonetheless
authorized their use in the trial court's discretion and held that the
court's exercise of such discretion was not reviewable. "The findings
of such a jury are, of course, merely advisory; the court must, as
it did in this case, make its own findings .... 91
Venue
Interpreting, apparently for the first time, the provision of
the title dealing with jurisdiction of the courts, the district court
for eastern Virginia concluded that the law means what is says,
namely that an action may be brought in any judicial district in the
state where the unlawful employment practice allegedly was com-
mitted. 92 Charged with sex discrimination, General Electric asked
the court for a change of venue and on May 10, 1972, the court had
agreed to transfer the action to the western district of Virginia. The
employees, who contended they had a right to pick the eastern dis-
trict as their forum, went to the appeals court for the district. That
court had vacated the order of transfer in an unreported opinion
and remanded the matter for a hearing.
On reconsideration the district court1 93 concluded it had erred
in its initial determination and examined the relevant portion of the
law, then §706(f), (now §706(f) (3)), both of which indicate that
an action may be brought in any judicial district in the state in
which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been
committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records
relevant to such practice are maintained or in the district in which
the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged improper prac-
tice, and also that if the respondent is not found with any of these,
that such an action may be brought within the district in which the
'"9Williams v. Travenal Laboratories, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 163 (N. D. Miss. 1972). However,
one district level determination has suggested that the right to a jury trial in any employ-
ment suit under 42 U.S.C. §1981, as distinguished from one pursuant to Title VII, "is
unsettled." Boles v. Union Camp Corporation, 5 F. P. D. 8051 (S. D. Ga. Nov. 10,
1972). "My present feeling is that the defendants are not entitled to both a non-jury ruling
by the chancellor as to injunctive and related relief under Title VII and to a jury con-
sideration of the same issues under § 198 1."
7 Logan v. General Fireproofing Co., 5 E. P. D. 8012 (W. D. N. C. Aug. 17, 1972).
191 Cox v. Babcock and Wilcox Co., 5 E. P. D. 8093, (4th Cit. Dec. 29, 1972).
192 Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 347 F. Supp. 1058, (E. D. Vir. 1972).
193 Id,
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respondent has his principal office. While the court found "disturb-
ing the suggestion that litigants may so blatantly engage in forum
shopping, it does not seem inconsistent with Congress' militant ap-
proach to affording citizens full redress of civil rights grievances
to allow plaintiffs a particularly wide latitude in choosing the situs
of their litigation.W9S
Testing
On March 8, 1971, in the area of testing, the United States
Supreme Court shattered job screening devices when it handed down
the decision of Griggs v. Duke Power Company. ' In Griggs, Black
employees of the company challenged its right to require either a
high school education or the passing of standardized general intel-
ligence tests as conditions for employment or promotion, the chal-
lenge being based upon the fact that neither standard had been
shown to be related to job performance and further, that both re-
quirements disqualified Blacks at a higher rate than Whites. Chief
Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court stated:
The Civil Rights Act proscribes not only overt discrimina-
tion, but also practices that are fair in form, but discrim-
inatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity.
If an employment practice which operates to exclude
Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance,
the practice is prohibited.9 [Italics added]
The Court concluded that neither of the two "tests" was shown to
bear a demonstrable relationship to performance of the jobs for
which it was used and that they had been adopted, as the court of
appeals had noted, without meaningful study of their relationship
to job performance ability.
The Court approved the Commission's guidelines "7 interpret-
ing §703 (h) on testing, which indicate that professionally developed
tests are permitted only if they test the applicant's individual abilitp
to do the work. The Court concluded that the interpretation of the
Act by the enforcing agency was entitled to great deference.
The Griggs decision is also momentous in that the Court re-
jected the notion that specific intent to discriminate is necessary to
establishing a Title VII violation; the Court held that the only
"41d. at 1060; In General Electric Co. v. Merhige, 5 E. P. D. q 8070 (4th Cit. Nov. 20,
1972), the Fourth Circuit denied a writ of mandamus seeking reversal, finding no abuse
of discretion.
195401 U.S. 424 (1971); see, order on remand, 5 E. P. D. 8017 (M. D. N. C. Sept. 25,
1972).
116 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
191d. at 436.
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relevant consideration is the consequence of the employment prac-
tice. If that consequence results in discrimination, the Court con-
cluded that the selection devices are proscribed, even in the absence
of a showing of intent to discriminate. 19
Incidently, as has already been briefly mentioned, the Court
utilized statistics to show that an employment practice which appears
fair on its face can nonetheless have a disparate effect when related
to statistics for the state in which the company plant was located, 99
which in that case showed that 34 % of the White males from the
state had completed high school (one of the company requirements),
while only 12% of the Black males had done so.
It is important to point out that the Court indicated that testing
or other measuring devices are not barred, nor does the law require
that the less qualified be preferred over the better qualified simply
because of their minority origin. What the law does require is that
tests used must measure the person for the job and not the person
in the abstract. The Griggs decision has thus effectively ruled out
general testing devices and diplomas or degrees as fixed measures
of capability, requiring the removal of artificial and arbitrary bar-
riers to employment when these barriers operate unfairly to dis-
criminate on one of the bases covered by Title VII2 5t
Several courts, relying upon the approach militated by Griggs,
have held that promotion and transfer systems where such promo-
tions were based upon the subjective evaluation and recommenda-
tion of the supervisory personnel fell under the Act's ban.2 ' These
decisions reasoned that the lack of standards in the individual evalu-
ation approach permitted the foremen involved to discriminate in
their choices.
Recent Developments in Sex Discrimination
In the first sex discrimination decision under Title VII before
the United States Supreme Court, the Court unanimously held in
January of 1971 that the law forbids one hiring policy for women
1 Id. at 432.
1tt Id. at 430.
20 As to the approach utilized by lower courts concerning complaints of discriminatory
educational and testing requirements and interpreting Griggs, frp e.g., United Stares v.
Georgia Power Co., 3 E. P. D. 5318 (N. D. Ga. 1971) and cases therein cited. On
the question of whether intent is a necessary element to maintain a cause of action
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, see the opinion in Local 2111 IBEW v. General
Electric Co., 4 E. P. D. 7614 (S. D. Ohio Dec. 3, 1971) wherein Judge Kinnear~y
indicates that Criggs makes it clear that proof of discriminatory intent is not necessary
for a Title VII action.
2 Rowe v. General Motors Corporation, 457 F. 2d 348 (5th Cit., 1972); Hester v.
Southern Railway Co., 5 E. P. D. 8046 (N. D. Ga. Oct. 3, 1972); Baxter v. Savannah
Sugar Refining Corp., 5. E. P. D. 8009 (S. D. Ga. Oct. 6, 1972) (authorizing attorney's
fees in the amount of $12,500).
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with pre-school age children and another for men who are like-
wise parents of pre-school age children.202 Specifically, the Court
stated that the refusal which was not shown to be related to the
job performance to hire women with such children while men in
the same circumstances are hired, was a violation of the Act. The
case is considered by many to be the first time that the Supreme
Court has acknowledged that women encounter discrimination when
seeking employment.
Other recent Supreme Court decisions have left standing ap-
pellate determinations concerning sex discrimination in employment.
In Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 20C the appellate court
barred an airline from discriminating against male flight attendants
(stewards). The court ruled that sexual bias against males holding
such position was not justified by the fact that airline customers
preferred females, since the Commission guidelines on sex discrim-
ination make clear that such customer preference will not be suffi-
cient to justify a bona fide occupational qualification exception to
the requirements of the Act.2M
In the already mentioned Sprogis case2 05 it was held that a com-
pany rule which allowed hiring only of non-married stewardesses
and allowed termination of those who subsequently married was
unlawful. This result was indicated, according to the appeals court,
even though those terminated were offered employment in other
jobs upon becoming married and the employer had no intention of
discriminating.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held in the case of Bart-
mess v. Drewreys Limited"' that a compulsory retirement plan that
required female employees to terminate at an earlier age than that
for men amounted to unlawful sex discrimination (females required
to retire at age 62 while males are allowed to continue working until
65). Recently in northern Ohio, a federal district court in Fillinger
v. East Ohio Gas"7 without mentioning the Bartmess case ruled
substantially the same thing. Plaintiff was awarded a judgment in
the amount of $10,000 for three years of unpaid wages. In Peters
v. Missouri-Pacific Railroad Company,20 8 the eastern district of Texas
ruled in 1971 that a company policy requiring Blacks to retire at 65
while White employees were permitted to work to age 70 constituted
-2400 U.S. 542 (1971).
23442 F. 2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
'Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F, 2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 950 (1971).
205Sprogis v. United Airlines, 444 F. 2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
20441 F. 2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
207 4 E. P. D. 5 7618 (N. D. Ohio 1971).
m 3 E. P. D. 8274 (E. D. Tex 1971).
[Vol. 22:72
33Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1973
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS - EEO LITIGATION
illegal race discrimination, entitling the Black employees to rein-
statement, back pay awards with interest with no set-off or credit
for any amount received from other sources and recovery of attorney
fees and litigation costs.0
State Protective Laws
An area of recent hot controversy concerns the so-called "state
protective laws" established in many states, including Ohio, to pro-
tect women from improper working conditions, which is believed
at least to have been the initial intent in the enactment of such laws.
These laws prohibit the employment of women in certain occupa-
tions, limit their hours of work and the weights they may lift and
require certain benefits for women workers, such as minimum wages,
premium pay for overtime, rest periods, and physical facilities. In
light of recent technological improvements in industry, many women
now believe that such laws discriminate against them in the regu-
lation of the maximum number of hours in which they can work
and in the statutory enactments concerning restriction from jobs
requiring the lifting of more than a certain number of pounds. The
Commission shares that belief and Commission guidelines specifically
provide that state laws restricting the employment of women under
such conditions are superceded by Title VII under the supremacy
clause of the Federal Constitution and accordingly, do not justify a
refusal to employ women. 1
A trend of federal court decisions has been to support this
view. In an early opinion, Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Company, 11
the plaintiff was denied a financially attractive job as an agent-
telegrapher because it would require her to work overtime in excess
of the state maximum hours law and lift excess weight in violation
of another state law, both of which applied only to women. The court
adopted the position of the Commission as expressed in the guide-
lines that a woman must be allowed the same opportunity as a man
to demonstrate her physical ability to perform a job and must not
be denied a job on the basis of some sex stereotype, the state law
to the contrary notwithstanding.
Rosenfeld was followed very quickly by Bowe v. Colgate-Palm-
olive Company,"' which adopted a similar approach based upon the
Commission guidelines and indicated that the employer must notify
its workers that each of them who desired to do so would be given
a chance to demonstrate his or her ability to perform more strenu-
219 See also, Rosen v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 409 F. 2d 775 (3d Cit. 1969).
21029 C. F. R. §1604.2.
211 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C. D. Cal. 1968).
"1416 F. 2d 711 (7th Cit. 1969).
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ous jobs and any employee who could so demonstrate would be
permitted to bid on and fill any such job to which his or her seniority
would entitle him or her. Since the employer 35 pound weight lifting
restriction for females was not a bona fide occupational qualification,
a layoff of female workers on the basis of that requirement was
discriminatory.
In 1971, there were a number of federal district court opinions
in the State of Ohio, striking down such laws under Ohio Revised
Code Chapter 4107 as being in conflict with Title VII and therefore
falling under the supremacy clause of the Constitution, article VI.
In Ridinger v. General Motors Corporation, Frigidaire Division"
Judge Weinman concluded that the provisions of Chapter 4107 of
the Ohio Revised Code which limited the number of hours women
may work, designated certain occupations as prohibited for them
and restricted employment in jobs that required lifting of weights
over 25 pounds, were invalid because they conflicted with Title VII.
Since the state restrictions required employers to discriminate in
the employment of women on the basis of a stereotyped character-
ization as to their capabilities without reference to individual abil-
ities, these laws were unconstitutional. The court concluded that an
employer was not liable for back pay to female employees under
these circumstances where he had acted "in good faith" in comply-
ing with the state restrictive laws. 214 Since the employer had ceased
complying with the laws, the court indicated injunctive relief against
future violations was not necessary. The northern district ruled
essentially the same thing in Manning v. General Motors Corpora-
tion.215 The court held that the revised guidelines of the Commission
under §1064216 holding the state laws invalid did not remove the un-
certainty placed upon the employer because of the conflict between
the state and federal laws and that the employer was entitled to a
court determination as to what proper course to follow.
217
On February 9, 1972, in the already mentioned Parmer case
211
in discussing the company good faith reliance on the protective
statutes, and after citing Ridinger, the court indicated, "in any
z13 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S. D. Ohio 1971).
2 4 Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S. D. Ohio 1971).
2153 E.P. D. 8325 (N. D. Ohio 1971).
26 29 C. F. K. §1604.
"
1tManning v. General Motors Corp., 3 E. P. D. fl8325 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Sec also, Rinehart
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 4. E. P. D. J 7520 (N. D. Ohio 1971); Esposito v.
General Motors Corp., Civil No. 71-819 (N. D. Ohio 1972); General Electric Co. v.
Hughes, 454 F. 2d 730 (S. D. Ohio 1971), afi'd per curiass 454 F. 2d 730 (6th Cir.
1972); Jones Metal Products Co. v Walker, 25 Ohio App, 2d 141, 267 N. E. 2d 814
(1971), holding that the state laws wece not in conflict with Title VII, re'vd, 29 Ohio
Sr. 2d 173, 281 N. E. 2d 1 (1972).
21 Parmer v. Nat'i Cash Reigster Co., 346 F. Supp. 1043 (S. D. Ohio 1972).
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event, this Court is in no position to rule on good faith reliance on
a statute at the motion to dismiss stage of these proceedings." 21
The following month in Czerw v. General Motors Corporation"0
Judge Walinski indicated:
With respect to pecuniary relief, the award of back pay,
defendant asserts that its reliance in good faith upon the
Guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission on December 2, 1965, (wherein the
agency's belief was expressed that the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was not intended to disrupt State statutes protecting
women employees) constitutes a valid defense under 42
U.S.C. §2000-e-12 to claims arising prior to August 19,
1969, when amended Guidelines were issued. The Courts in
Manning and Ridinger so held, and this Court concurs
therein.
However, with respect to claims arising between August
19, 1969, when the EEOC issued its amended Guidelines,
and May 1, 1970, when defendant ceased compliance with
the protective statutes, this Court has serious doubts as to
the validity of the good faith reliance defense. Although
the Court appreciates the defendant may have been un-
certain and unsure of the effect of the amended Guidelines,
the Court is as aware now as the defendant was in Novem-
ber, 1969, at the latest, of a possible solution for defendant's
"dilemma" via the declaratory judgment statutes, 28 U.S.C.,
§ §2201, 2202 . . . unlike Ridinjqer, the "record" before this
Court does not yet establish defendant's compliance in good
faith with the Ohio Statutes . . . . Therefore, this Court
cannot now reach the conclusion of Ridinger with respect
to pecuniary damages, for the period August 19, 1969
through May 1, 1970.221
Because of the last two cited opinions and others from other
jurisdictions (as will be mentioned below) it appeared that there
might be some vitality to the back pay issue in this jurisdiction.
However, on September 11, 1972, the Sixth Circuit handed down
its opinion in Manning v. General Motors Corporation.2 22 After sum-
marizing the facts which led the district court in Manning to deter-
mine that the company was caught between the "rock and the whirl-
pool" and therefore in good faith in its reliance upon the state
protective laws, the court distinguished other circuit opinions which
219 Id.
2' Civil No. 71-331 (N, D. Ohio Mar. 26, 1972).
2 Czerw v. Gcneral Motors Corp., Civil No. 71-331 (N. D. Ohio Mar. 25, 1972).
"1466 F. 2d 812 (6th Cir. 1972)
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had granted back pay in the state protective laws situations, in-
cluding Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company,23
and Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Company.224 Having done so, the
appeals court concluded that defendant General Motors did not have
the benefit of any judicial determination of the validity of the laws
until 1971 and the enforcing agency had not handed down any ad-
ministrative interpretation which would assist in resolving the con-
flict until August of 1969.
Under all the circumstances of this case we cannot con-
clude that the District Judge abused his discretion in deny-
ing back pay to these Plaintiffs."
Obviously, this decision is going to be the cause of substantial
argument between those who seek to read it "narrowly" as a mere
holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in the im-
mediate case (which might not have the effect of denying back pay
under all state protective law situations in the jurisdiction) and
those who see the case as a broad denial of back pay in state pro-
tective law matters in the Sixth Circuit. The issue is certainly a
lively one and one which is going to continue to involve a consider-
able amount of litigation.
Two cases allowing back pay on state protective law-related
situations are Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Company,2 ' and Schaeffer
v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc.227 In Schaeffer the court concluded
that the employee was to be compensated for the extra hours she
would have worked except for the discrimination from the date the
employer became aware of the November 22, 1968 Rosenfeld de-
cision, and the change of the Commission Guidelines in January
of 1969:
We conclude, therefore, that Sehaeffer is entitled to re-
ceive back pay for the extra hour per day from the date
when the Company had knowledge of both the Rosenfeld
case and the commission's decision in favor of Schaeffer
(i.e., on some undetermined date subsequent to 1-22-69, to
and including 10-7-69, the date the Company allowed 9 hour
daily employment for women.)121
The Weeks Court indicated that back pay might be appropriate
and remanded for determination of the appropriate relief. 29 The
23408 F. 2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
"1416 F. 2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
225 Manning v. General Motors Corp., 466 F. 2d 812, 816 (6th Cir. 1972).
22 6416F. 2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
'462 F. 2d 1002 (9th Cit. 1972).
... Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F, 2d 1002, 1007 (9th Cit. 1972).
2"1 Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F. 2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
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Manning Court distinguished Weeks by indicating that it was a case
in which the Georgia rule relating to weights had been repealed
before the case was before the court of appeals. On remand, the
Weeks trial court awarded plaintiff $3761 as back pay.23 0
Maternity Leaves and Terminations
Another area of discrimination on the basis of sex which has
come to the fore lately deals with pregnancy leaves or terminations.
The Commission has established the principle that in general an em-
ployer may not terminate an employee who is compelled to cease
work because of pregnancy. Rather, he must offer a leave of absence
with the right to reinstatement to the position vacated or an equi-
valent position at no loss of seniority or any of the other benefits
and privileges of employment. In general, pregnancy is to be treated
like any other medical disability.
One of the first court determinations involving the employment
rights of expectant mothers under Title VII was issued in February
of 1971 in Schattman v. Texas Employment Commission.231 The
district court found that the policy of requiring all female employees
to cease work at the conclusion of their seventh month of preg-
nancy violated the Act and that such policy did not take into con-
sideration the willingness of the individual female employee to
continue work, her rate of performance or her need for personal
medical safety. The state agency which was the employer was
assessed with damages representing the value of her back wages and
with the cost of the action, including attorney fees.
On March 1st, 1972, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed the earlier decision and held that the set agency policy did
not violate any constitutional rights and further that the employ-
ment was not terminated because the employee was a woman nor
because she was pregnant, but only because her pregnancy was far
advanced. The court held that the pregnancy leave rule, though
based on sex, was reasonable and rationally related to the per-
missible stated objective of providing efficient operations of its em-
ployment services.232
Shortly after the district opinion in Schattman, the district
court in Kansas dealt with a similar problem. In Jane Doe v. Osteo-
pathic Hospita! of Wichita," the discharge of a female hospital em-
ployee because of her condition of being pregnant and unwed
230 Contra, Garneau v. Raytheon Co., 341 F. Supp. 336 (D. Mass. 1972); Le Blanc v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 333 F. Supp. 602 (E. D. La. 1971), afl'd per cariam, 460 F. 2d 1228
(5th Cir. 1972), cart. denied, . U.S ------- 5 E. P. D. f 8021 (Nov. 6, 1972).
231 330 F. Supp. 328 (W. D. Tex. 1971).
232459 F. 2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, - U - , 5 E. P. D. 8099 (Jan 8,
1973).
23 3333 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Kan. 1971).
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amounted to unlawful sex discrimination. The hospital claim that its
public image was affected by the continued employment of this
unwed, pregnant female was not supported by the evidence and the
hospital was held liable for the earnings lost by the employee as a
result of her discharge. Essentially, the court rejected the hospital
claim by stating that it was not the basis of a justifiable business
necessity for the discharge.
LaFieur and Nelson v. Cleveland Board of Education,24 con-
cerned an action brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983 by school teachers
against the Cleveland School Board since at the time of the action
Title VII did not cover such state governmental employees. The
maternity leave policy in question required a pregnant teacher to
take an unpaid leave of absence five months before the expected
birth of the child and to continue on such status until the beginning
of the first school term following the date when the baby became
three months old. The district court judge had concluded that the
rule did not discriminate against women and was not unreasonable
or arbitrary to the extent that it was unconstitutional, concluding
that it was intended to avoid against disruption of the student's
education and embarrassment, as well as to protect the health of
the mother and child.
The circuit court recognized that the Schattman decision dealt
with a "distinctly less onerous maternity leave rule" 235 and further
that Title VII had since been amended to make it applicable to
public school employees, also noting EEOC regulation §1604.10(b).
The court indicated that the three month enforced unemployment
after birth had no relation to the employer's interest at all. The
school superintendent had testified that he thought that without the
rule, pregnant teachers would be subjected to "pointing, giggling
and snide remarks" 2 6 by the students. "Basic rights such as those
involved in the employment relationship and other citizenship re-
sponsibilities cannot be made to yield to embarrassment." '23 The
court concluded the rule was inherently based upon a classification
by sex and was arbitrary and unreasonable.2 8
23 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N. D. Ohio 197 ),vacated and rev'd, 465 F. 2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972).
235La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ,, 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N. D. Ohio 1971), vacated and
rev'd, 465 F. 2d 1184, 1186 (6th Cir. 1972).
236 Id.
2311d. at 1187.
23 See also, Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Edue., 345 F. Supp. 501 (S. D. Ohio 197"2) (action
under §1983 concerning discharge of nontenured teacher with less than three yeats service
under existing policy during sixth month of pregnancy resulting in striking down of said
policy; back pay and reinstatement allowed) , Jinks v. Mays, 4 E. P. D. 19 7684 (N. D Ga.
Sept. 23, 1971) (untenured-cenured dichotomy unconstitutional under §1983); Williams
v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 483 (N. D. Cal. 1972) (preliminary
injunction granted enjoining enforcement of policy requiring leave at least two months
before delivery date).
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In Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, an action under
42 U.S.C. §1983, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals2 9 affirmed a
Virginia district court opinion,240 holding that a school board policy
of requiring pregnant teachers to take leaves of absence at the end
of the fifth month of pregnancy denied equal protection. The ma-
jority found no reason why a pregnant teacher must accept a re-
quired leave at that time if she and her physician concluded she
could perform the teaching function past that date. The court
specifically agreed with the LaFleur appeals decision. Chief Judge
Haynsworth dissented.
Four months later the appeals bench, sitting en bane, by a 4-3
vote reversed its earlier decision. 4' The majority opinion of Chief
Judge Haynsworth almost precisely followed his earlier dissent. He
concluded therein that the regulation in question was not an in-
vidious discrimination based on sex. "It does not apply to women
in an area in which they may compete with men."'' The majority
reasoned that the regulation served a reasonable purpose of main-
taining continuity in the classroom, necessitated by the circumstance
that 80% of the school system's teachers are women.
The dissent, written by Judge Winter, echoed his earlier ma-
jority opinion in the first appeals decision. Holding as self-evident
that the regulation is sex discrimination, he noted the fear that if
the present majority ultimately prevails, it might have the effect of
enervating implementation of Title VII.
At this writing, a petition for certiorari has been filed in
LaFleur,43 and it may well require a decision by the Supreme Court
before some long-term conclusions in this area can be reached.
"Long Hair" Employment Discrimination
Just as the Diaz case 2" involves males making a claim of un-
lawful sex discrimination, another area of similar import involves
long hair cases. In a recent Ohio case, Roberts v. General Mills,2
45
the plaintiff was fired because a hat was not sufficient to cover his
hair in the exposed food department of the company and the com-
pany would not permit him, as it did women, to wear a hair net.
After the individual instituted an action in federal court, the com-
2395 E P D. 7967, (4th Cit. Sept. 14, 1972).
'10326 F. Supp. 1159 (E. D. Va. 1971).
-1 5 E. P. D. 8419 (Jan. 15, 1973).
243 La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N. D. Ohio 1971), vacated and
rev'd, 465 F. 2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. filed, Civil No. 72-777 (Nov. 27, 1972).
24442 F. 2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
24533/ F. Supp. 1055 (N. D. Ohio 1971)_
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pany moved to dismiss and the federal court overruled the motion.
Although the defendant argued convincingly for the need for quality
control in food processing, Judge Young stated that it was not these
reasonable measures of ensuring sanitary conditions which were
being attacked by the plaintiff; rather, the complaint was focused
on what class of employees could wear the hairnets. According to
the court:
It does not appear that contamination could occur any
more easily from a man's hair contained within a hairnet
than a woman's.4 6
The court also rejected the defendant's argument that it had the
"absolute" right to make such rules as it wished regarding its
employees.
Donohue v. Shoe Corporation of America,47 involved a similar
issue. In that case, a former retail shoe salesman litigated under
Title VII because of his discharge supposedly due to the length of
his hair, arguing that the employer permits females to wear long
hair and therefore his termination violated the Act. Citing EEOC
interpretations, the court ruled on the motion to dismiss that the
claim of a bona fide occupational qualification was not sufficient,
since it must be pleaded and proved by the employer as a defense,
The court held the agency determination was entitled to deference
by the court and refused to dismiss the action against the company.
244
Arrest And Conviction Records
In Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 25 the court again looked into
the consequences of an employment practice and not to the employer
246 Roberts v. General Mills Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1055, 1056 (N. D. Ohio 1971).
241337 F. Supp. 1357 (C. D. Cal. 1972).
2m See also, Diddams v. Univ. Hosp., 3 E. P. D. 8244 (W. D. Wis. 1971) (injunction
granted barring suspension from employment of the employees of the state hospital because
of the length of their hair); Lindquist v. Coral Gables, 323 F. Supp. 1161 (S. D. Fla. 1971)
(in the absence of showing controlling governmental interests essential to the safety of the
agency, the rule setting hair styles for fire fighters was invalid and the termination of a
fireman violated his rights; reinstatement with full tenure and salary); Ramsey v. Hopkins,
447 F. 2d 128 (5th Cir. 1971) (Black public school teacher discharged for refusing to
comply with ban on wearing mustaches was entitled to reinstatement and back wages);
Doyle v. Buffalo Sidewalk Cafe, Inc. 333 N. Y. S. 2d 534 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) (injunc-
tion issued directing employer to refrain from discriminating in the employment of bus-
boys on grounds of length of hair of applicant, based on state law); Conrad v. Goolsby, 5
E. P. D. 8076 (N. D. Miss. Oct. 31, 1972) (discharge of teachers for failure to conform
to school "code of conduct" regulating beards, sideburns and mustaches, violated 42 U. S. C.
§1983; adults have ight to decide own hair styles). Contra, Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc.,
3 E. P. D. 8184 (D. D. C. 1971) (employer did not discriminate either on the basis
of race or sex in terminations of Black employees for beards and white employees for long
hair; Baker v. Calif. Land Title Co., 349 F. Supp. 235 (C. D. Cal. 1972) (granting of
motion to dismiss on finding that duel employment policy was not discrimination against
males with long hair); Boyce v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 5 E. P. D. 8077 (D. D. C. Dec. 4,
1972) (not unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII for market to discharge male whose
facial hair and hair length violated store's grooming code).
249 316 F. Supp. 401 (C. D. Cal. 1970), ag'd as modified, 5 E. P. D. 8089 (9th Cir. Dec.
7 1972).
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intent or lack thereof. The court determined that an employer could
not refuse to employ applicants with arrest records, as distinguished
from conviction records, where the practice had a disparate effect
on minorities and was not compelled by business necessity. In
GTegory, the plaintiff had a record of fourteen different arrests but
had never been convicted of any criminal offense."' the court found
that the company policy was objectively applied and enforced to
all without regard to race.5 1 Secondly, there was a determination
that there was no evidence to support the claim of the company
that persons who have suffered no convictions, but have been ar-
rested on a number of occasions, can be expected when employed to
perform less efficiently or less honestly than other employees, 25
2
and that therefore information concerning an employee record of
arrests without convictions was held to be irrelevant to his suit-
ability for employment 253
The court relied substantially on the proposition that a dis-
proportionate number of Blacks are arrested in proportion to their
population and that therefore any policy disqualifying prospective
employees because of having been arrested discriminates in fact
against Black applicants.
On the question of intent, the court indicated:
An intent to discriminate is not required to be shown so
long as the discrimination shown is not accidental or in-
advertent. The intentional use of a policy which in fact
discriminates between applicants of different races and can
reasonably be seen so as to discriminate, is interdicted by
the Statute, unless the employer can show a business neces-
sity for it. In this context "business necessity" means that
the practice or policy is essential to the safe and efficient
operation of the business. Paperworkers Local 189 v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir., 1969). As previously stated,
the Court finds that the policy in question is not justified
or excused by business necessity in this case.254
Accordingly, the court ordered a money judgment by way of com-
pensatory damages for the difference between what the individual
earned since the defendant's original offer of employment had been
withdrawn (upon learning of his arrest record) and what he would
have earned had he been employed by defendant. Punitive damages
were denied, but attorney fees in the amount of $5,000 and costs
250 Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C. D. Cal. 1970).
2I Id. at 402.
252 Id.
23 Id, at 403.
254 d,
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were awarded, and the defendant was enjoined from seeking from
applicants for employment information concerning prior arrests
which did not result in conviction or from utilizing as a factor in
determining a condition of employment or promotion any record of
arrest not resulting in conviction.255
The area of employment discrimination concerned with arrest
and/or conviction records has been the source of a good deal of
comment in law review articles.5 In one Note it has been stated:
Perhaps the greatest inequity caused by arrest records is
discrimination in employment practices. In no other private
area are such records used so extensively and with such
devastating results. Recent surveys have demonstrated more
than amply the widespread use of arrest records in the
making of employment decisions.22 7
That this is more than a mere academic proposition can be seen
by the large number of charges dealing with alleged discrimination
because of arrest and/or conviction records and by a substantial
number of Commission decisions on the subject. In the case of
Carter v. Gallagher,"' the district court had ruled that in view of
statistical evidence showing that a greater number of Blacks than
Whites are arrested and convicted, a civil service requirement that
applicants for the position of city fireman have no conviction record
had the unlawful effect of depriving Blacks of job opportunities and
was held interdicted by 42 U.S.C. §1981. At the time of the decision,
local and state employees were not covered by Title VII. However,
on appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in construing the
trial court ruling on this question, indicated as follows:
The provision of 7(a) relating to the elimination of ap-
plicant arrest records is approved.
The provisions of 7(b), particularly subdivision (i)
thereof, are too broad. The parties agree that a conviction
of a felony or misdemeanor should not per se constitute an
25 The court of appeals affirmed the holding that the use of the arrest records, without
convictions, as a basis for refusal to hire, was race discrimination, but vacated the injunction
issued barring use of the records, since the plaintiff did not want his job back and had
agreed to accept damages if hr prevailed and the decision reasoned the injunction would
benefit no one before the court. 5 E. P. D, 8089 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1972).
56 See Comment, Arrest Records and Employment Discrimination, 32 U. OF PITTS. L. REV.
254 (1971); Note, Titie VII, Racial Disrimination in Employment-Employer's Use of
Records of Arrests Not Leading to Convictions. 17 WAYNE L. REV. 228 (1971); Comment,
Arrest Records as a Racially Discriminatory Employment Criterion, 6 HARv. CIv. RIGHTS -
Civ. LIE. L. REV. 165 (1970); Note, Arrest Records Hiring Policies and Racial Discrimin-
atios, 57 IowA L. REV. 506 (1971); Comment, Discriminatory Hiring Practices Due To
Arrest Records - Private Remedies, 17 VILE L_ REV 110 (1971).
257 Comment, Discriminatory Hiring Pracrices Due To Arrest Records -Private Remedies,
17 VILL. L. R.v, 110, 111 (1971).
m 337 F. Supp. 626 (D. Minn. 1971).
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absolute bar to employment. We are persuaded by Defend-
ant's argument that applicants' conviction records, at least
in cases of aggravated offenses and multiple convictions,
may have a bearing on the suitability of an applicant for a
Fire Department position both from the standpoint of pro-
tecting fellow firemen and the public. The Trial Court in
its discretion may require the Defendant to submit to it
for approval a rule with respect to the consideration to be
given to an applicant's conviction record, which at a min-
imum should not treat conviction as an absolue bar to em-
ployment. We would not consider any rule giving fair
consideration to the bearing of the conviction upon appli-
cant's fitness for the Firefighter job to be inappropriate. 59
The case of Richardson v. Hotel Corporation of America,26 held
that a hotel's discharge of a Black bellman after learning of his
convictions for theft and receipt of stolen goods was not improper
discrimination because the position was properly termed "security
sensitive" as the bellman had access to the hotel keys. In essence,
defendant made out a business necessity defense and also offered
plaintiff another job in a non-security position.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has recently
entered as amicus curiae in Holliday v. Seaway Foods in the northern
district of Ohio, eastern division, which concerns the issue of
whether defendant violated the Act by discharging Plaintiff ware-
house employee after 51/2 years employment upon learning of prior
convictions of criminal offenses, the last of which occurred seventeen
years prior to discharge.
Garnishments
In an analogous area, another federal trial court' 61 in California
recently held that a company rule requiring the firing of an employee
after several garnishments of his wages results in unlawful dis-
crimination against minorities, even though the rule is "racially
neutral" and applied to all. The court indicated that statistics
showed that more Blacks than White had their wages garnisheed.
Therefore, the Griggs and Gregory standard was to be applied,
unless there could be some justifiable business necessity. Although
the company could show that the rule was needed to avoid incon-
venience and extra expense, the court rejected this as sufficient
business necessity. Again the issue of the employer good faith and
2 59 Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F. 2d 315 (8th Cit. 1971), modified on other grunds on
rehearing 4 E. P. D. V 7616 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 2045 (1972).
260332 F. Supp. 519 (E. D. La. 1971), afJ'd without opinion, 5 E. P. D. 8101 (5th Cir.
Nov. 27, 1972).
261 Johnson v. Pike Corp., 332 F. Supp. 490 (C. D. Cal. 1971).
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lack of discriminatory intent was not to be controlling in the Court's
judgment, since the effect of the practice was discriminatory.
Conditions of Employment
Many cases have concerned the conditions of the employment
relations as possible bases of an action under Title VII. §703 (a) (1)
makes it an unlawful practice for an employer "to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment ... ."I" §703(a) (2) renders
it unlawful "to limit, segregate or classify his employees or ap-
plicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee . *..."'I Such cases in-
clude the already discussed state protective law decisions due to the
nature of the statutes in placing conditions upon the work relationship.
Rogers V. EEOC,2" concerned an optical services company which
was charged by a former employee with discrination against her
because of her national origin. As one of the two bases for the alleged
discrimination, the charging party indicated the practice of segre-
gating Black patients from White patients. EEOC received the em-
ployment records from the employer, who declined to give it the
additional records of applications by patients for services. The trial
court indicated that the alleged practices regarding the patients
could not be viewed as an unlawful employment practice. 5 In the
appeals court, one judge indicated that the psychological fringes in
the employment relationship were within the area of EEOC in-
vestigative authority. He ruled that the practice of the employer in
segregating his customers on racial lines affected the sensibilities
of employees to the extent of making such biased practice an un-
lawful employment practice.26 The second judge concurred in the
result of allowing access to the records but only on the ground that
requiring the employee to attend such segregated patients would
amount to an unlawful practice. 67 The third judge dissented, agree-
ing with the Trial Court disposition of the matter2
In Wilson v. Sibley Memorial Hospital,21 the district court ruled
that a hospital was not entitled to dismissal of an action brought
against it by a male professional nurse claiming unlawful sex dis-
26242 U. S. C. §2000-e-2(a) (1) (1970).
26342 U. S. C, §2000-e-2(a) (2) (1970).
264454 F. 2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), rert. denied, 93 S_ Ct- 554 (1972).
265Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F. 2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 554 (1972).
261Id. at 238-39.
161 Id. at 241.
263 Id. at 243.
26340 F. Supp. 686 (D. D. C. 1972).
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crimination in being deprived of job opportunities by the hospital
on the ground that he was not its employee since the Act requires
only that the charging party be an "aggrieved person." Accordingly,
the court ruled that he had standing to file the charge with the
agency and the complaint in court.
More importatitly, the court ruled that the hospital engaged in
an unlawful discrimination against the male nurse on account of his
sex when it deprived him of employment opportunities by denying
him access to female patients when he arrived at the hospital on
assignment by a professional nurse's registry.
Steel Workers Local 1104 v. United States Steel Corporation,
270
dealt with a ruling that an employer did not engage in unlawful
sex discrimination by paying male employees for their lunch periods
because they were on call during such time, while not paying female
employees who were required by state hours laws to have a free
time lunch period. The employer was not granting to male employees
a lunch hour that it was possible to give female employees under the
provisions of state laws as they were then being enforced. Having
sought exception to the state laws, the employer had, moreover, an
adequate defense in its good faith reliance on the state law. The
court reasoned that whichever direction the company turned, it
would face a claim of sex discrimination because of the state law
as it then existed. Accordingly, the claim for back pay by the females
was denied.
Another approach to this area can be seen in Hays v. Potlatch
Forest, Inc.,"' where the court of appeals reasoned that any dis-
crimination against male employees could be avoided by extending
the daily overtime paid benefits required by state law for women.
In this way, the validity of the state law remained intact. The court
found support for its solution in the Equal Pay Act272 which bars
the reduction of pay or benefits in equalizing pay among the sexes
and in the regulations of EEOC. Additionally, extension of the bene-
fits for the men would not place an unreasonable burden on the em-
ployer since he could merely rearrange his working schedules so
that no employee worked more than eight hours a day until all
employees had worked their first forty hours in a work week.
Lack of Citizenship as a Basis for Discrimination
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Espinoza v. Farah
Manufacturing Company" that a denial of employment to a Mexican
2'0 United Steel Workers, Local 1104 v. United States Steel Corp., 4 E. P. D. f{ 7899 (N. D.
Ohio 1972).
2 Hays v. Potlatch Forest, Inc., 465 F. 2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1972).
272 29 U. S, C. §206 (d) (1).
272 Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 462 F. 2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1972).
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alien under a policy of refusing to hire non-citizens did not amount
to unlawful discrimination on account of national origin. Although
the court held that EEOC guidelines were entitled to deference, the
agency determination that discrimination on the basis of citizenship
is equivalent to discrimination on the basis of national origin need
not be followed where it does not comport with the clear intent of
congress to limit the prohibition to discrimination based on the
country from which an individual or his forebears came. The court
discussed the EEOC regulation and found at 29 C.F.R. 11606.1 (d). The
court ruled that where the practice of excluding aliens was a mere
pretense to camouflage national origin discrimination, the regulation
would come into play, but such was not the situation in the instant
case. To the extent that such regulation was intended to make such
discrimination per se illegal, the court refused to follow the regulation.
On the other hand, in Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corpora-
tion,' a trial court in the southern district of Texas five days before
the Espinoza decision in a case brought under both Title VII and
§1981 held that the wording of both of those Acts indicated that
congress intended to protect all persons within its jurisdiction rather
than the narrower classification of all citizens and the grant of
preference in the assignment of dock jobs to American citizens
unlawfully discriminated against a Mexican national. The same
court, after pronouncement of Espinoza, held that while that case
indicated lack of citizenship was not covered by Title VII, the con-
dition of alienage was within the purview of 42 U.S.C. §1981, grant-
ing "all persons" equal protection of the laws and accordingly the
action was maintainable under the general civil rights statute.
2 5
Lastly, in an action brought under §§1981 and 1983 of Title
42 U.S.C., the District Court in the Southern District of New York
had ruled on November 9, 1971 that in the absence of a compelling
interest which would justify the restrictions of state civil service
laws that conditioned state employment on American citizenship,
such laws are invalid as unlawfully denying aliens the equal benefits
of the laws."' Claims of a need for loyalty and efficiency in employ-
ment were insufficient to justify the discharge of aliens by a muni-
cipal agency since there was no claim of a security risk. Probable
jurisdiction was noted by the United States Supreme Court on June
12, 1972 along with an order granting the motion of the appellees to
proceed in forma pauperisY7
17 Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 350 F. Supp. 529 (S. D. Tex. 1972).
5 5E. P. D. 1 8068 (S. D. Tex. Nov. 6, 1972).
7 Dougall v. Sugarman, 339 F. Supp. 906 (S. D. N. Y. 1971).
211 Motion of appellees for leave to proceed in forma pauperis gianted 92 S. Ct. 2434; See also,
Jalil v. Hampton, 460 F. 2d 923 (D. C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 5 E. P. D. V
7994 (Dec. 10, 1972), indicating that a resident alien was entitled to a determination as
(Continued on next page)
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The 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act
Significant changes were made in Title VII with the enactment
in March of 1972 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act." ' The
goal of this section will be to discuss recent significant changes in
the 1964 Act brought about by the amendments of 1972 and by the
subsequent revision of certain of the regulations authorized under
the Act and amendments. One of the more significant changes auth-
orized by the amendments was the inclusion of state and local
governments and political subdivisions within the coverage of the
Act by redefining the term "person" in §701(a).279 The term "em-
ployer" in 701(b) 28 0 has also been changed by the removal of state
and local governments from the excepted entities and this class of
newly covered public employers includes all state and local govern-
ments, governmental agencies and political subdivisions and certain
of the departments or agencies of the District of Columbia. Most
federal employees are covered by a new section dealing with non-
discrimination in federal employment.2 81
The term "employer" has also been changed to cover employers
with fifteen or more employees (for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year), as opposed to the present number of twenty-five. (This
change will go into effect one year after the enactment of the
amendments).
§701(c)282 has been changed to eliminate the language that pro-
vided a partial exception for agencies of the federal government
and states or political subdivisions from the definition of "employ-
ment agency." The effect of the latest amendments is that state
employment agencies are now also subject to the law as employers.
§701 (e)28 concerning the definition of "labor organization" has
been altered to expand coverage to organizations with at least fifteen
members (one year after the enactment of the amendments), as
opposed to the present number of twenty-five.
(Continued fromn preceding page)
to whether certain federal civil service regulations excluding aliens from consideration are
unconstitutional; Faruki v. Rogers, 5 E. P. D. 8015 (D. D. C. Oct. 6, 1972) where a
three judge court struck down as equal protection-violative a ten year durational citizen-
ship requirement for foreign service officers; Herriort v. City of Seattle, 499 P. 2d 101,
(Wash. Sup. Ct. 1972) holding that a citizenship requirement for the position of city bus
driver in the municipal civil service rules was unconstitutional.
210 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNiTY ACT OF 1972, PUB. L. NO. 92-261, 86 STAT. 103.
'"PUB. L. No. 92-261, §2(1) (Mar. 24, 1972).
... PUB. L. No. 92-261, §2(2) (Mar. 24, 1972).
2 PUB. L. No. 92-261, §11 (Mar. 24, 1972).
T22PUB. 1. No. 92-261, §2(3) (Mar. 24, 1972).
283PuB. L. No. 92-261, §2(4) (Mar. 24, 1972).
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A major change is in the definition of the term "religion" in
§701(j).'" In this respect, the amendments have broadened a former
exemption.25 The exemption from the ban on religious discrimina-
tion allowed religious corporations was formerly restricted to em-
ployees working at religious activities, but has been broadened by
the amendments to cover all secular activities of the religious cor-
poration.2 Another effect of the changes in §702 is that educational
institutions are no longer exempt, except in those cases of institu-
tions maintained by religious corporations and certain elected posi-
tions in state and city school systems. 2 7 Obviously, the effect of this
change is going to be monumental in light of the many cases of
employment discrimination which have previously been filed under
related acts dealing with educational institutions employment prac-
tices. This elimination of the exemption applies to both public and
private educational institutions. Debate in congress reflects the fact
that discrimination against minorities and women in the field of
education was found to be as pervasive as discrimination in any
other area of employment and the elimination of the exemption will
bring approximately 120,000 of such institutions under the law; in
terms of employees it's believed the law will apply to approximately
2.8 million teachers and professional staff members and another 1.5
million non-professional staff members,
As to the broadening of the exemption for religious corpora-
tions, they are still subject to the ban on discrimination in employ-
ment on account of race, color, sex, or national origin.
One important change in §703 (a) 28 is to include the words "ap-
plicants for employment" to make it very clear that the unfair prac-
tices therein proscribed apply to such applicants. The section is
really declaratory of present case decisions. 9
§7052fl sets out changes in the composition of the Commission
and appointment procedures for regional directors. See also the
changes in 705 (b) (1) and (b) (2) concerning the operations of
the Office of General Counsel. Note that under subsection (b) (2),
the Attorney General shall conduct all litigation to which the Com-
mission is a party in the U.S. Supreme Court.
2 Put3. L. No. 92-261, §(7) (Mar. 24, 1972).
's CIL RIGHTS Act oF 1964, 42 1U. S. C. §2000e-1 (1970).
2' Pun. L. No. 92-261, §§2(7) and 3 (Mar. 24, 1972).
287 Pun. L No. 92-261, §3 (Mar. 24, 1972).
2B3 Pun. L. No. 92-261, §8(a) (Mar. 24, 1972).
289 See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
29 PuB. L. No. 92-261, §8(d) (Mar. 24, 1972).
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§706291 sets out the enforcement authority of the Agency and
one of the significant changes is to allow the filing of a charge not
only by aggrieved parties or members of the Commission but also
by persons on behalf of such individual. Another important change
in §706(b) is that the Commission is required to serve a notice of
the charge on the named respondent within ten days. The Commis-
sion is required by the section to make its determination on reason-
able cause as promptly as possible and "so far as practicable, not
later than 120 days from the filing of the charge . . ." After the
charge in writing under oath or affirmation is filed and the Commis-
sion has made its determination on reasonable cause, if it finds in
the affirmative it is to attempt to conciliate the case. In determining
whether or not there is reasonable cause the Commission is to
accord "substantial weight" to the findings and orders made by
the state or local deferral agencies.
§706(c)22 continues the system of making deferrals of the
charge to any state agency or political subdivision of a state which
has a law prohibiting that type of unlawful employment practice.
The section provides for deferring the charge to such state or local
agency for a period of sixty days unless the agency deferred to
terminates the proceedings earlier.
With reference to §706(e)' of the amendment, formerly
charges had to be filed within 90 days after the alleged unlawful prac-
tice occurred in cases where there was no deferral agency qualified to
investigate the type of discrimination alleged; in cases where the Com-
mission deferred to a state or local agency, the charge previously
had to be filed within 30 days after the charging party received
notice that the state agency had terminated its proceedings or
within 210 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, which-
ever was earlier. Under the new section, charges must now be filed
within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice in non-deferral
circumstances and 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice
occurred or 30 days after the state or local agency terminated pro-
ceedings on deferrable questions, whichever is earlier. The changes
in the law as to the number of days are intended to have no effect
on present case law that has determined that certain types of viola-
tions are continuing in nature and accordingly toll the statute of
limitations on filing charges.
Newly enacted §706(f) (1)294 authorizes the agency for the first
time to bring a civil action against an uncooperative respondent in
federal court, except in those instances where that respondent is a
21 Pus. L. No. 92-261, §4(a) (Mar. 24, 1972).
292 Id.
29314.
mi4d.
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governmental entity. The main condition placed on the agency be-
fore instituting court action is that it has attempted but was unable
to achieve an acceptable conciliation agreement; the suit may be
brought 30 days after the charge has been filed with the agency or
30 days following termination of the state or local agency charge.
In cases involving a governmental agency or political subdivision,
EEOC cannot litigate in federal court directly but must refer the
case to the attorney general who may do so. The section also pro-
vides that persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in
civil actions brought by the Commission or the Justice Department.
The section continues by indicating that if the Commission
dismissed a charge or after 180 days have elapsed from the filing
of the charge without the Commission or the attorney general hav-
ing filed a court complaint, or without the Commission having entered
into conciliation, that private individuals may initiate court action.
Such actions must be brought in the appropriate district court within
90 days after receiving notification of the right to sue. The significant
change here is that since the Commission formerly had no right to
litigate directly, the individual only had to wait 60 days after the
charge was filed by EEOC before asking for a right to sue. In this
sense he must "cool his heels" a little longer. Additionally, former
§706 gave the charging party only 30 days in which to file his litiga-
tion after getting a right to sue. In this respect, the time for litigating
has been broadened hopefully sufficiently to allow the attorney to
study the case and prepare a court complaint.
The subsection still authorizes the court to appoint an attorney
"in such circumstances as the court may deem just" for such com-
plainant and may authorize the commencement of the action without
the prepayment of fees or costs. The court may, "in its discretion"
permit the Commission or the attorney general to intervene in such
civil actions. Under the pre-amended law, only the attorney general
could intervene in private suits. Note also that the courts have dis-
cretion to stay proceedings for not more than 60 days pending deter-
mination of state or local proceedings or efforts of EEOC to obtain
voluntary compliance.
Newly enacted §706 (f) (2)125 authorizes the Commission or the
attorney general, in cases involving government, to bring actions for
temporary or preliminary relief when prompt judicial action is
necessary.
New §706 (g) 96 (like the former 706(g)) authorizes the court
upon finding that the accused party has engaged or is engaging in an
unlawful practice to issue an injunction barring the continuance of
25 Id.
29614d'
LVol. 22:72122
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same and to order affirmative relief as may be appropriate includ-
ing, but not limited to, reinstatement or hiring, with or without
back pay. The major change here is that under pre-amended law,
it was presumably possible to assess back pay for these unlawful
acts all the way back to the effective date of the original Act, July
2, 1965. The amendments place a limitation on back pay liability so
that they are assessed from a date not more than two years prior to
the filing of a charge with the Commission.
§706(k) 29 as before authorizes the court in its discretion to
allow the prevailing party other than the government a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the cost.
The major change in §7070 concerning pattern or practice
suits is that such suits could previously be litigated only by the
Attorney General of the United States whereas the amendments have
given concurrent jurisdiction in this area from the date of enact-
ment to the agency for a period of two years, at which point EEOC
shall have sole authority in this regard."99 §§709300 and 7101t deal
with investigations and inspections by EEOC and continue to au-
thorize the Commission to have access to the records of persons
being investigated under a charge filed. Previously, persons required
to keep certain records under the Act could seek an exemption on
the grounds of undue hardship either by applying to the agency or
bringing a civil action in federal court. However, the law now
requires the party seeking such exemption to first make an applica-
tion to the agency and only if the agency denies the request can
the party bring the federal court action. An important change in
the law is brought about by the amendment to §710 to the effect
that for the purposes of all hearings and investigation, §11 of the
National Labor Relations Act,302 shall apply. The section of the
NLRA authorizes the Board or its agents to have access to and the
right to copy evidence of persons being investigated or proceeded
against. The Board or member thereof is authorized by that Act
to issue subpoenaes requiring the attendance and testimony of wit-
nesses or production of any evidence. Within five days after service
of such subpoena, persons are authorized to petition the Board to
revoke the subpoena if the evidence does not relate to matters under
investigation. In cases of an individual's refusal to obey the sub-
297 CIVIL RIGHs ACT OF 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5 (1970).
I" PuB. L. No. 92-261, §5 (Mar. 24, 1972).
2 Id.
301PuB. L. No. 92-261, §6 (Mar. 24, 1972).
0 PU . N. 92-2(1, 97 (Mar. 24, 1972).
32229 U. S. C. § 161 (1970); see also, 29 C. F. R. § 1601.14 et seq.
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poena, district courts of the United States upon application by the
Board shall have jurisdiction to issue such person an order requir-
ing appearance of the person or production of the evidence.
This "subpoena power" under the Commission's new regula-
tions and new procedures being drafted will apparently authorize
district directors or deputy district directors to issue such admin-
istrative subpoenaes, putting the burden upon the individual against
whom it is issued to seek agency action within five days revoking
the subpoena. In cases where there is a refusal to obey the sub-
poena, the agency will file an action in federal court. Since these
procedures have not been finalized at the time of this writing, it is
impossible to indicate how effective they will be. This procedure
replaces the former "demand for access" procedure which the pre-
vious law authorized.
Conclusion
At the time of this writing, the agency has filed less than 30
actions under the amendments of March 24, 1972 and even when
fully operational, the Commission does not contemplate filing more
than 390 cases a year. Because of this, it is obviously extremely
important that the private Bar be concerned with, interested in and
educated in Title VII and related litigation matters. Unless the Bar
accepts this challenge, in light of the tremendous backlog of cases
and the heavily burdened agency, it is going to mean a substantial
denial of employment rights for many "aggrieved persons." It is
hoped that this paper will in some very small way supply at least
some of the information to assist the members of the Bar willing
to take up this challenge.
The right to work, I had assumed, was the most precious
liberty that man possessed. Man has indeed as much right
to work as he has to live, to be free, to own property . . . it
does many men little good to stay alive and free and
propertied, if they cannot work. To work means to eat. It
also means to live. For many it would be better to work
in jail, than to sit idle on the curb .... 301
3D Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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